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Abstract 
In recent years, income inequality has become a major topic of  analysis. Several factors, 
such as quality of  institutions, corruption, labour markets, technological change or financial 
liberalization and financial development, have been suggested as possible causes. Regarding 
the latter two factors the empirical literature is still scarce and not conclusive. Moreover, the 
potential mediating effect of  corruption on the relation between financial liberalization and 
financial development and income inequality has been overlooked.  
Thus, in order to fill in these gaps, the focus of  the present study is on assessing the impact 
of  financial liberalization and financial development on countries’ inequality and on evalu-
ating how this impact is mediated by countries’ corruption levels. For pursuing such en-
deavour, we resort to panel data estimation techniques on a sample of  127 countries be-
tween 2000-2017.   
We found three main results. First, financial development unambiguously contributes to 
decrease countries’ income inequality. Second, financial liberalization has not a clear-cut 
impact on income inequality; it decreases income inequality when financial liberalization 
indicator is measured by the net foreign direct investment inflows (in percentage of  the 
GDP) but it aggravates income inequality when the proxy for financial liberalization is the 
countries’ degree of  capital account openness. Third, corruption emerges as a significant 
mediator for the relationship between financial liberalization/ development and income 
inequality. Albeit, as expected, corruption jeopardizes more equal income distribution, it 
was found that in contexts characterized by high levels of  corruption (or low transparency), 
the decreasing effect of  financial development on income inequality is leveraged. In con-
text paved by middle degree of  corruption, when statistically significant, both financial 
development and financial liberalization reduces income inequality. For highly transparent/ 
low corruption contexts, neither financial liberalization nor financial development matters 
for explaining income inequality. 
Summing up, if  the aim of  public authorities in high and middle corruption contexts is to 
reduce income inequality, their efforts should be directed towards attracting more foreign 
direct investment and/or developing financial markets by improving the private credit lev-
els and the monetization ratio. 
JEL Codes: D31; D63; D73; O11; O15 
Keywords: Financial Liberalization; Financial Development; Income Inequality; Corruption 
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Resumo 
Nos últimos anos, a desigualdade de rendimentos tem sido um tópico importante de análi-
se. Vários factores têm sido sugeridos como causas, tais como a qualidade das instituições, 
a corrupção, o mercado de trabalho, mudanças tecnológicas, liberalização financeira ou 
desenvolvimento financeiro. Relativamente aos dois últimos tópicos, a literatura é escassa e 
inconclusiva. Para além disso, o potencial efeito mediador da corrupção na relação entre as 
variáveis liberalização e desenvolvimento financeiro e a desigualdade de rendimentos tem 
sido negligenciado.  
Deste modo, para preencher as lacunas da literatura, o objetivo deste estudo passa por ana-
lisar o impacto da liberalização e do desenvolvimento financeiros na desigualdade de ren-
dimentos dos países e por avaliar como o impacto é mediado pelo contexto de corrupção. 
Para pôr esta análise em prática, recorremos a técnicas de estimação de dados em painel 
para uma amostra de 127 países, no período 2000-2017.  
Com esta análise, alcançámos três principais resultados. Em primeiro lugar, o desenvolvi-
mento financeiro contribui inequivocamente para a redução da desigualdade de rendimen-
tos dos países. Em segundo, a liberalização financeira não tem um impacto claro na desi-
gualdade de rendimentos; diminui-a quando é medida pelas entradas líquidas de investi-
mento directo estrangeiro (em percentagem do PIB), mas aumenta-a quando a proxy é o 
grau de abertura da conta de capital dos países. Em terceiro, a corrupção é uma variável 
mediadora na relação entre liberalização/ desenvolvimento financeiros e a desigualdade de 
rendimentos. Apesar de, como esperado, a corrupção ter impacto negativo na distribuição 
de rendimentos, os nossos resultados apontam para o facto de, em contextos de alta cor-
rupção (baixa transparência), o efeito redutor do desenvolvimento financeiro na desigual-
dade de rendimentos ser exacerbado. Em contextos de média corrupção, quando estatica-
mente significativo, tanto o desenvolvimento financeiro como a liberalização financeira 
reduzem a desigualdade de rendimentos. Em contextos de baixa corrupção (alta transpa-
rência), nem a liberalização financeira nem o desenvolvimento financeiro são relevantes 
para explicar a desigualdade de rendimentos.  
Em suma, no caso de as autoridades públicas terem o objectivo de reduzir as divergências 
de rendimentos, em contextos de alta e média corrupção, os esforços devem ser direccio-
nados para atrair investimento directo estrangeiro e/ ou para desenvolver os mercados fi-
nanceiros melhorando os níveis de crédito privado e o rácio de monetização. 
v 
Index 
 
Bio ......................................................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................. ii 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. iii 
Resumo ............................................................................................................................................................... iv 
Index of  Tables ................................................................................................................................................. vi 
Index of  Figures .............................................................................................................................................. vii 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 
2. The impact of  financial liberalization and financial development on countries’ income inequality: 
a literature review ............................................................................................................................................... 4 
2.1. Relevant concepts .................................................................................................................................. 4 
2.1.1. Financial liberalization ................................................................................................................... 4 
2.1.2. Financial development ................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1.3. Income inequality ........................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2. Mechanisms that link financial liberalization to income inequality ................................................ 8 
2.3. Mechanisms that link financial development to income inequality .............................................11 
2.4. Financial liberalization/ development and income inequality: the mediating factor of  
corruption .....................................................................................................................................................13 
2.5. Empirical evidence ...............................................................................................................................16 
2.5.1. Financial liberalization .................................................................................................................16 
2.5.2. Financial development .................................................................................................................17 
3. Methodology ................................................................................................................................................20 
3.1. Main hypotheses and the choice of  the methodology ...................................................................20 
3.2. Econometric specification ..................................................................................................................21 
3.3. Data sources and variables’ main proxies.........................................................................................21 
4. Empirical results ..........................................................................................................................................24 
4.1. Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................................................24 
4.2. The impact of  financial liberalization and development on income inequality: empirical 
results .............................................................................................................................................................32 
5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................39 
5.1. Main contributions...............................................................................................................................39 
5.2. Policy implications ...............................................................................................................................41 
5.3. Limitations and paths for future research ........................................................................................41 
Annex ................................................................................................................................................................49 
 
vi 
Index of Tables 
 
Table 1: Financial Liberalization definitions and indicators ....................................................................... 5 
Table 2: Financial Development definitions and indicators ....................................................................... 6 
Table 3: The impact of  financial liberalization/development on income inequality: empirical 
evidence ..............................................................................................................................................18 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics .........................................................................................................................24 
Table 5: Countries by groups of  transparency ............................................................................................26 
Table 6: Correlation matrix ............................................................................................................................31 
Table 7: Panel data estimations of  the determinants of  countries’ income inequality, 2000-2017 ....38 
 
  
vii 
Index of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms that link financial liberalization/development to income inequality and the 
mediating effect of  corruption ....................................................................................................15 
Figure 2: Gini index, global and by countries’ transparency group, 2000-2017 ....................................27 
Figure 3: Financial liberalization, 2000-2017 ...............................................................................................28 
Figure 4: Financial development, 2000-2017 ..............................................................................................29 
Figure 5: GDP per capita growth, 2000-2017 .............................................................................................30 
Figure 6: Trade openness, 2000-2017 ...........................................................................................................30 
Figure 7: Inflation, 2000-2017 .......................................................................................................................31 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decades, governments of  both developed and less developed countries targeted 
the reduction of  income inequalities as a top priority, especially after the financial crisis 
(OECD, 2018a). In 2013, former US President Barack Obama reported rising income ine-
quality as the “defining challenge of  our time”, adding that his administration would focus 
all efforts on it during his presidency.1 According to the World Bank (2018),2 income dis-
parities reduction is fundamental in order to guarantee opportunities and mobility for today 
and upcoming generations. Presently, within country inequality is higher than it was in the 
beginning of  the 90s, undermining sustained economic growth, poverty reduction, social 
stability and opportunities’ access (World Bank, 2018).3  
According to the World Inequality Lab (2018), rising income disparities might lead to catas-
trophes in the political and social fields. Between 1980 and 2016, the income of  the richest 
1% increased the double of  the poorest 50%, resulting in a shrinkage of  the middle class in 
EU and USA. The income growth of  the individuals of  the bottom 50% of  the world 
population was nearly 0% for the same period. In 2016, according to OECD (2018a), in-
come inequality in OECD countries reached its highest level from the last fifty years with 
“the average income of  the richest 10% of  the population [being] about nine times that of  
the poorest 10% across the OECD, up from seven times 25 years ago”.4  
Income inequality is generally associated with economic inefficiency and lower economic 
growth (OECD, 2017), perceived as socially unfair, weakening social stability and solidarity 
(Todaro and Smith, 2015). 
Recent literature (see Bumann and Lensink, 2016) suggests several causes for income ine-
quality, namely financial liberalization and financial development, the quality of  institutions, 
corruption, labour markets, and technological change. Regarding the two first determinants 
- financial liberalization (that is, reduction in the government’s role in financial markets) 
                                                          
1 In https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/obama-income-inequality-minimum-wage-live, in 
The Guardian, accessed on the 9th October 2018. 
2 In https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/isp/overview#1, accessed on the 20th October 2018. 
3 However, according to Peterson (2017), there is a common agreement that total income distribution equality 
is not fair nor desirable. As individuals make different contributions to the output, having different approach-
es and attitudes towards work, in a market economy it is a natural result to have different rewards based in the 
citizen’s contribution (Mankiw, 2013). According to Mankiw (2013) and Watson (2015), having equality of  
opportunities is the key to a fair income inequality as it is a result of  personal endeavour. In fact, countries 
with the greatest degree of  divergences in opportunities are the ones with higher income inequality levels 
(Deaton, 2013). 
4 In http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm, accessed on the 20th October 2018.  
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and financial development (increase in the volume of  financial activity) –, extant theoretical 
and empirical studies have produced ambiguous results, leaving an open debate.  
At the theoretical level, some authors (e.g., Bumann and Lensink, 2016) contend that finan-
cial liberalization reduces income disparities through an increase in the efficiency of  banks 
and a decrease in borrowing costs, whereas others (e.g., de Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm, 
2017) suggest that financial liberalization might lead to market volatility and consequently 
uncertainty, leading low income individuals to increase their savings, which cause a decline 
in interest rates, and amplify income inequalities. Additionally, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2007) and de Haan and Sturm (2017) underline that on the one hand, the poorer, 
which lack collateral and credit histories, may be benefited by the relaxation of  credit con-
straints, that is, by financial development; but, on the other hand, an increase in the quality 
and quantity of  the financial services tend to benefit the richer (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990; de Haan and Sturm, 2017). 
At the empirical level, the debate about whether financial liberalization/development in-
crease/ decrease income inequality is also intense. Concerning financial liberalization, ex-
tant evidence for several parts of  the globe, namely India (Ang, 2010), Africa (Batuo and 
Asongu, 2015), and large panels of  countries (Bumann and Lensink, 2016; de Haan and 
Sturm, 2017) show that financial liberalization worsens income inequality. On the contrary, 
Bumann and Lensink (2016) found that it has the opposite impact on income disparities, 
but only in countries where financial depth- private credit over GDP- is high. With respect 
to financial development, Ang (2010) proved that financial development reduces income 
inequalities in India, while de Haan and Sturm (2017) reached the opposite result for a pan-
el of  121 countries between 1975 and 2005.  
Besides the absence of  consensus regarding the impact of  financial liberalization and fi-
nancial development on income disparities, the relation between these set of  variables is 
likely to be influenced by the quality of  the institutions. Indeed, according to Delis, Hasan, 
and Kazakis (2014) and de Haan and Sturm (2017), in a strong institutional environment, 
financial development might allow the poorer to invest more in human and physical capital, 
reducing income disparities; in contrast, when institutions are weak, only the richer and 
more powerful have privileged access to financing and so financial development will prob-
ably harm the poorer.  
Corruption stands as one critical dimension of  countries’ institutional quality (Bjørnskov, 
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2011). Very few studies (e.g., Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015; Adams and Klobodu, 2016) 
addressed the mediating effect of  corruption on the relation between financial develop-
ment and income inequality having concluded that corruption eroded the positive impact 
of  financial development on income distribution in 21 Sub-Saharan African countries be-
tween 1985-2011 (Adams and Klobodu, 2016) and in 30 Commonwealth countries during 
1995-2008 (Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015). Nevertheless, there has been no attempt in the 
literature to investigate the mediating effect of  corruption on the relation between financial 
liberalization and income inequality.  
Trying to contribute to the above literature gaps, the present study has two main aims: 1) to 
empirically assess the impact of  financial liberalization and financial development on in-
come inequality; 2) to analyse the mediating effect of  corruption on these relations. For 
pursuing such endeavour, it will resort to fixed effects panel data model, for a sample of  
127 countries over the period 2000-2017. 
The remainder of  this study is structured as follows. The next section details the main con-
cepts, followed by a brief  analysis of  the mechanisms that link financial liberalization/ de-
velopment to income inequality and the mediating impact of  corruption, as well as an anal-
ysis of  the empirical evidence on the topic. Section 3 details the methodological approach, 
explaining the choice of  the methodology, the econometric specification, the data sources 
and the proxies of  the main variables. Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics and the 
empirical results of  this study and the last section concludes. 
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2. The impact of financial liberalization and financial development on 
countries’ income inequality: a literature review 
2.1. Relevant concepts 
2.1.1. Financial liberalization 
Many studies investigate the issue of  financial liberalization. However, no clear-cut defini-
tion of  such concept exists, with most studies referring the indicator of  financial liberaliza-
tion instead of  its concept (see Table 1).  
Starting with the studies that provide a conceptual definition of  financial liberalization, 
Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda (2008) define it as a reduction in the government’s role and an 
increase in the role of  financial markets. More recently, Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel 
(2010), and Bumann and Lensink (2016) suggest that financial liberalization encompasses a 
set of  government interventions in the financial sector in order to, for instance, remove 
entry barriers for new financial institutions, reduce reserve requirements, lift restrictions on 
capital accounts or privatize financial institutions. Agnello, Mallick, and Sousa (2012) add 
that financial liberalization entails the decline of  the control of  the financial sector by the 
government. 
In those studies that do not present a specific definition for financial liberalization provid-
ing instead a measure, the most frequent measure used is the Abiad, Detragiache, and Tres-
sel (2010) financial liberalization index (Agnello, Mallick, and Sousa, 2012; Delis, Hasan, 
and Kazakis, 2014; Li and Yu, 2014; Christopoulos and McAdam, 2017; de Haan and 
Sturm, 2017; de Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm, 2017). This index encompasses the de jure 
changes in interest rate and credit controls, privatizations, international financial transac-
tions restrictions and banks entry barriers (Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel, 2010; de Haan 
and Sturm, 2017). Other alternatives, but less frequently used measures include the de jure 
Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account openness index (KAOPEN) (Batuo and Asongu, 
2015; Bumann and Lensink, 2016; de Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm, 2017) or the de facto capi-
tal account openness - foreign direct investment: FDI as percentage of  GDP (Batuo and 
Asongu, 2015, Bumann and Lensink, 2016). 
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Table 1: Financial Liberalization definitions and indicators 
Author Definition Measure/Indicator 
Abiad, Detragiache, and Tres-
sel (2010); 
Bumann and Lensink (2016). 
Set of  government interventions in the 
financial sector in order to, for instance, 
remove entry barriers for new financial 
institutions, reduce reserve requirements, 
lift restrictions on capital accounts or 
privatize financial institutions. 
Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account 
openness index (KAOPEN). 
Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda 
(2008). 
Reduction in government’s functions and 
an increase in financial markets’ role. 
Abiad and Mody (2005) financial 
liberalization index. 
de Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm 
(2017). 
Reduction in the role of  government and 
an increase in the role of  financial markets. 
Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2009) 
financial liberalization index and Chinn 
and Ito (2008) capital account open-
ness index. 
Agnello, Mallick, and Sousa 
(2012). 
Decline of  the control of  the financial 
sector by the government. 
Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2009) 
financial liberalization index. 
Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis 
(2014). 
No definition. 
Li and Yu (2014). 
Christopoulos and McAdam 
(2017). 
de Haan and Sturm (2017). 
Ang (2010). 
Demetriades and Luintel (1996, 1997) 
Financial liberalization measure. 
Batuo and Asongu (2015). 
De jure Chinn and Ito (2008) capital 
account openness index (KAOPEN) 
and de facto capital account openness 
(foreign direct investment: FDI as 
percentage of  GDP). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.1.2. Financial development 
In Levine’s (2005) broader concept, financial development includes an improvement in the 
quality of  five key financial functions: information regarding possible investments and allo-
cating capital; monitoring after allocating capital; easing diversification, trading and risk 
management; mobilizing and gathering savings; facilitate the exchange of  financial instru-
ments, goods and services. Also underlying the aspect of  improvement, Adams and 
Klobodu (2016) contend that financial development involves an upgrading in several finan-
cial intermediaries’ characteristics such as efficiency, quality and quantity, whereas Čihák, 
Feyen, Kunt and Levine (2012) sustain that it occurs when the effects of  costs of  transac-
tion, limited enforcement and asymmetric and imperfect information are reduced by finan-
cial intermediaries, instruments and markets. Finally, and in a simpler way, Abiad, Oomes, 
and Ueda (2008); de Haan and Sturm (2017) define financial development as an increase in 
the financial activity’s volume. 
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Again, as in the case of  financial liberalization, some studies do not present a definition for 
financial development. Instead, they simply provide proxies or indicators for this variable, 
namely (see Table 2) the ratio of  private credit over GDP (Ang, 2010; Hamori and 
Hashiguchi, 2012; Kunieda, Okada, and Shibata, 2014; Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015; de 
Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm, 2017), which is also used by studies that conceptually define 
financial development. The ratio of  private credit over GDP analyses the credit that goes 
from savers to private firms through financial intermediaries, which means that credit to 
the central bank, development banks, credit to state owned enterprises and the public sec-
tor are not included in this measure.   
Table 2: Financial Development definitions and indicators 
Authors Definition Measure/Indicator 
Levine (2005) 
Improve in five key financial functions’ 
quality. 
1. Private credit over GDP. 
2. Commercial bank assets over commercial 
bank assets plus Central Bank assets. 
3. Credit to private enterprises over GDP. 
Čihák, Feyen, Kunt 
and Levine (2012) 
Financial development occurs when the 
effects of  costs of  transaction, limited 
enforcement and asymmetric and imperfect 
information are reduced by intermediaries, 
financial instruments and markets. 
1. Private credit over GDP. 
2. Financial institutions’ assets over GDP. 
3. Monetization ratio - M2 over GDP. 
4. Deposits over GDP. 
5. Gross value added of the financial sector 
over GDP. 
Adams and Klobodu 
(2016) 
Improvement in several financial interme-
diaries’ characteristics, such as efficiency, 
quality and quantity. 
1. Private credit over GDP. 
2. Deposit money over central bank assets. 
Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, 
and Mahalik (2017). 
“Financial development includes policies, 
factors and institutions leading to efficient 
intermediation and an effective financial 
market”. Private credit over GDP. 
Abiad, Oomes, and 
Ueda (2008); de Haan 
and Sturm (2017) 
Increase in the financial activity’s volume. 
Ang (2010) 
No definition.  
1. Private credit over GDP. 
2. M3-M1 over GDP. 
3. Commercial bank assets over commercial 
bank assets plus Central Bank assets. 
4. Bank density - number of bank offices in a 
population. 
Hamori and Hashigu-
chi (2012) 1. Private credit over GDP. 
2. Monetization ratio - M2 over GDP. Batabyal and Chow-
dhury (2015) 
Kunieda, Okada, and 
Shibata (2014) 
Private credit over GDP. 
de Haan, Pleninger, 
and Sturm (2017). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Although the monetization ratio (M2 over GDP) emerges as a commonly used indicator 
(Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Čihák, Feyen, Kunt and Levine, 2012; Batabyal and Chow-
dhury, 2015), private credit over GDP has the advantage of  capturing the society’s savings 
that are received by private firms (de Haan and Sturm, 2017). 
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2.1.3. Income inequality  
According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2013), development theo-
ry has been studying inequality mainly in the material dimension, that is in income, wealth, 
wage, health, nutrition, and education.  
Inequality is an embracing concept, usually prone to confusion, as it might be studied from 
different perspectives. Indeed, as stated in UN (2015), ‘economic inequality’ is often used 
as synonyms of  ‘monetary inequality’, ‘income inequality’, ‘wealth inequality’ or, in a more 
comprehensive perspective, ‘living conditions inequality’. 
The debate around economic inequality, as a broader definition of  an economic disad-
vantage, has been analysed between two main strands (UN, 2015). On the one hand, the 
inequality of  outcomes consists in inequalities in several dimensions of  human well-being 
that individuals might control through their effort and talent (for instance, educational at-
tainment or level of  income). On the other hand, the inequality of  opportunities entails 
that some society segments face less social, economic and political opportunities due to 
circumstances people cannot control and are beyond personal choices as result of  their life 
background (for example, gender, race, place of  birth), such as access to education or ac-
cess to employment (UN, 2015).  
As reported by UNDP (2013), income inequality is a particular dimension of  inequality of  
outcomes that influences several dimensions of  human well-being, as there is a strong rela-
tion between income inequality and health, education or nutrition inequalities. Measuring a 
country’s overall income inequality is a fundamental way to analyse its welfare levels and its 
ability to face poverty reduction.5  
Income inequality has been a very discussed topic in the recent decades (World Inequality 
Lab, 2018). Most studies do not provide a concrete definition on the topic and the ones 
that do suggest rather short and identical explanations when comparing among studies. 
According to OECD (2016, p.102), “[i]ncome inequality is an indicator of  how material 
resources are distributed across society”, being a starting point to analyse equity among 
citizens (OECD, 2011). In another perspective, Todaro and Smith (2015) define income 
inequality as the total national income disproportionately distributed by all citizens or, more 
specifically, according to Ngamaba, Panagioti, and Armitage (2018), it is the unbalanced 
                                                          
5 In http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/income-inequality, accessed on the 20th 
October 2018. 
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distribution of  household disposable income. In other words, it is how uneven income is 
divided across a population in an economy.6 
The household disposable income represents the sum of  earnings, self-employment, capital 
income and public transfers, deducted by income taxes and social security contributions 
(OECD, 2018b). According to Haughton and Khandker (2009), it is mainly influenced by 
three effects. First, the endowment effects, i.e., by the household and people’s characteris-
tics (job, gender, education, geographic factors or capital accumulation). Second, the price 
effect, whether there are modifications in the return of  the assets or their characteristics 
(for instance, wage and profit rate). Finally, the occupational choice effects, that is, the way 
people fund their assets (for example, if  by work, what type of  job). To correctly analyse 
income inequality, one should not separate income inequality earned from labour or from 
capital (money obtained from rents, dividends and interests) (UNDP, 2013). 
As income inequalities are partly due to a rise in capital incomes (World Inequality Lab, 
2018), there is a flourishing interest in analysing wealth inequality. Wealth inequality is the 
situation of  personal assets disproportionally distributed among a society (Hurst, 2007). 
Personal assets consist of  goods that value household wealth, such as houses, corporations’ 
earnings, savings, investments and other personal valuables (Hurst, 2007).  
Besides the analysis among the whole society, inequality can be studied between society 
groups. Focusing on wage inequality, it is the uneven distribution of  money received from 
work among people in an economy and is commonly analysed particularly based on the 
race (Darity, 1982; US Census Bureau, 2010) or on the gender (US Census Bureau, 2010; 
European Commission, 2014). 
 
2.2. Mechanisms that link financial liberalization to income inequality 
Income inequality is affected by financial liberalization through three main channels (Ares-
tis and Caner, 2004; Ang, 2010): 1) Economic growth; 2) Access to credit and financial 
services; and 3) Financial crisis. 
First, income inequality can be influenced by financial liberalization through the increase in 
the economic growth rate (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Arestis and Caner, 2004; Ang, 
2010). According to Arestis and Caner (2004), financial repression (that is, distortions in 
                                                          
6 In https://inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/, accessed on the 24th November 2018. 
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interest rates) makes the financial system relatively smaller in comparison with the non-
financial system because there is a lower propensity to save and to hold bank deposits, de-
creasing the banking system real size and consequently shorting the credit supply, generat-
ing a slower real rate of  economic growth. In the circumstance of  financial repression, the 
nominal interest rate is fixed administratively, maintaining real rate below the level of  equi-
librium, encouraging consumption and discouraging saving. The average efficiency of  in-
vestments is reduced by ceilings on loan rates because lower return investments are profit-
able now and they would not be with a higher equilibrium interest rate. Therefore, if  inter-
est rates ceiling are removed, in other words, if  there is a process of  financial liberalization, 
saving would increase, improving also the average return to investment as profits with low 
yields are not lucrative and worthwhile anymore. Thus, output will increase with the im-
provement in investment efficiency. 
Besides the removal of  interest rates ceilings, two strands of  financial liberalization, stock 
market and capital account liberalization (i.e. capital controls reduction) (Bumann and 
Lensink, 2016), can also contribute to an increase in economic growth rate because they 
can result in higher capital flows and investment in poor countries, reduced cost of  raising 
capital, transfers of  know-how and technology (which may help to improve productivity), a 
more developed supervisory and regulatory banking framework (increasing financial ser-
vices’ quality) (Arestis and Caner, 2004). 
In a nutshell, financial liberalization, through an increase in the economic growth rate, can 
reduce income inequalities through two ways. The first entails that economic growth affects 
regions, sectors and their production factors which may create better job opportunities for 
the poorer. The other denotes that redistributing gains can result from economic growth as 
it might increase financial resources to invest in critical areas for the poorer, improving 
public spending and transfers (Arestis and Caner, 2004). 
Focusing on less developed countries and following the line of  thought of  Arestis and 
Caner’s (2004) economic growth channel, Batuo and Asongu (2015) postulate that one rea-
son for these countries’ slow economic growth is the administratively setting of  low real 
interest rate which result in low levels of  saving. Thereby, financial liberalization, liberaliz-
ing and deregulating interest rates would motivate savings and improve the credit supply 
available in the economy, namely to the poorer, enabling higher and quicker economic 
growth rates and narrowing income disparities.  
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Second, a better and broader access to financial services and credit might narrow income 
disparities as more people have access to finance and can obtain credit with fewer borrow-
ing costs to invest in business and/or education (Arestis and Caner, 2004; Ang, 2010). Ad-
dressing this issue, Bumann and Lensink (2016) developed a theoretical model with a bank-
ing sector and agents with different investment abilities. The most skilled investment agents 
become investors and the less skilled become savers. The former are able to earn a large 
amount of  money, while the latter earn a smaller amount. Reserve requirements and for-
eign funds (used to finance domestic loans) are set, supervised and managed by the finan-
cial regulator. According Bumann and Lensink (2016), financial liberalization increases the 
efficiency of  banks and decreases borrowing costs. Deposit rates will rise to re-establish 
the financial market equilibrium, reducing the wedge between deposits and loans interest 
rates. Such outcome has a positive impact on investors and savers, reducing income dispari-
ties.  
However, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990); Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis (2014) reject the 
idea that financial liberalization decreases income inequality. The authors suggest that 
banks with profit maximizing behaviour restrict lending to low income households and 
firms and would rather lend to wealthier ones because the former have low levels of  collat-
eral. Lending to poorer households is uncertain and may conflict with bank’s goal of  earn-
ing high yields with risky assets. Similarly, Batuo and Asongu (2015) advocate that banks 
avoid lending to poorer society groups due to credit market imperfections. Thus, low in-
come individuals will not benefit from the reduction of  financing costs induced by finan-
cial liberalization and have less probability of  starting their own business and create wealth. 
Hence, wealth will be concentrated in the upper groups of  society, increasing income di-
vergences. 
Finally, it is contended that financial liberalization might be associated to financial crisis, 
which will generate macroeconomic volatility, harming most particularly the poor, and thus 
widening income inequalities (Arestis and Caner, 2004; Ang, 2010). In the same line of  
thought, de Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm (2017), based on Bumman and Lensink’s (2016) 
theoretical model, suggest that financial liberalization might lead to market volatility and, 
consequently, uncertainty. Thus, as a precaution measure, low income individuals will in-
crease their savings which will cause a decline in interest rates, amplifying income dispari-
ties. 
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Based on the above, we conjecture that 
H1: Financial liberalization contributes to an increase in income inequality. 
2.3. Mechanisms that link financial development to income inequality 
Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik (2017) put forward three hypotheses for explaining the 
mechanisms whereby financial development impacts income inequality: 1) finance-income 
inequality widening hypothesis; 2) finance-income inequality narrowing hypothesis; and 3) 
finance-income inequality inverted U-shaped hypothesis.  
The former two hypotheses are based on mechanisms of  credit restrictions and the conse-
quent (in)ability to invest in education or business, whereas the latter hypothesis encom-
passes the access to financial markets mechanism.  
Financial development predisposes how family’s wealth, individual’s skills and initiative, 
political connections or social status affect individual’s economic opportunities during his/ 
her life. According to Čihák, Feyen, Kunt and Levine (2012), financial development influ-
ences whether the individual is able to pay for education, start a business, achieve economic 
aspirations or not. As a result, it can also influence the demand for labour (by influencing 
capital allocation) and thus impacting income disparities.  
The finance-income inequality widening hypothesis postulates that when institutional quali-
ty is weak, only the richer benefit from financial development due to their financial credibil-
ity, history and collateral, which will lead to an increase in income inequalities (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Jauch and Watzka, 2015; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, 
and Mahalik, 2017).  
The finance-income inequality narrowing hypothesis claim that financial development may 
allow the poorer to access credit to invest in education and business, enabling, in the long 
run, to reduce income inequalities (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Jauch and Watzka, 2015; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik, 2017).  
Focusing on the finance-income inequality widening/narrowing hypotheses, recently, de 
Haan and Sturm (2017) hypothesized that the poorer, which lack collateral and credit histo-
ries, may, on the one hand, be benefited by the relaxation of  credit constraints; but, on the 
other hand, an increase in the quality and quantity of  the financial services tend to benefit 
mainly the richer, the ones already owning financial services. Similarly, Hamori and 
Hashiguchi (2012) postulated that financial development will allow broader access to credit 
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and reduce financial frictions (Adams and Klobodu, 2016). Hence, poorer households and 
entrepreneurs would face less credit constraints and would have more access to finance and 
credit. Thereby there will be a better allocation of  capital and hence income divergences 
will narrow. Nevertheless, the authors highlight that the richer will be more benefited than 
the poorer because the latter may lack collateral and credit history (Adams and Klobodu, 
2016). 
In another perspective, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) and Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis 
(2014) highlight that income disparities might be decreased due to financial intermediaries, 
markets and contracts improvement because investment decisions affect the households’ 
future income. In the first study (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009), the authors argue that 
financial intermediaries influence how, in the long run, the income is the outcome of  inher-
ited goods or individual decisions that resulted in fruitful investments. Thus, if  financial 
intermediaries make possible to fund valuable investment ideas through developed financial 
instruments, then the individual’s future income ought not to be commanded by his/her 
economic endowment and income inequalities may narrow. In the other extreme, underde-
veloped financial systems and the associated financial imperfections (e.g. asymmetric in-
formation, moral hazard) might be especially harmful for the poorer fraction of  society, 
who face limited access to finance and lack collateral. Similarly, according to Levine (2005), 
facing these restrictions, poorer individuals cannot invest in their own businesses, which 
will wide even more income disparities. Financial development, by smoothing these credit 
constraints, might motivate entrepreneurship, turning financial services available to a bigger 
population proportion and allowing more individuals to take investment opportunities and 
create an income source. Therefore, a strong credit market will allow to overcome financial 
market imperfections and thus mitigating income divergences (Ang, 2010; Shahbaz, 
Bhattacharya, and Mahalik, 2017). 
At last, the finance-income inequality inverted U-shaped hypothesis advocates that in the 
early stages of  economic development only the rich can afford and have access to devel-
oped financial markets, increasing income disparities. As the level of  economic develop-
ment becomes higher, a larger proportion of  the population benefit from financial devel-
opment and income inequalities may decrease (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Jauch and 
Watzka, 2015; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik, 2017).  
By the same token, Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015) advocate that there is a nonlinear rela-
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tion between income disparities and financial development. According to the authors, in-
come divergences first increase with financial development, then they observe a period of  
stabilization and ultimately reduce, as more individuals are able to access financial markets 
and financial assets are no longer available only to the wealthier (Hamori and Hashiguchi, 
2012). Additionally, Levine (2005) suggests that progress in the financial system might first-
ly benefit the richer and the politically better connected and, due to financial illiteracy, in 
the first stages of  financial development, the poorer and low educated may have difficulties 
in obtaining credit, amplifying income inequalities (Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik, 
2017). 
Based on the above, we conjecture that 
H2: Financial development contributes to an increase in income inequality. 
 
2.4. Financial liberalization/ development and income inequality: the mediating 
factor of  corruption 
The impact of  financial liberalization and financial development on income distribution is 
likely to be mediated by the quality of  the institutions in general (Delis, Hasan, and Ka-
zakis, 2014; de Haan and Sturm, 2017) and, more specifically, by corruption (Bjørnskov, 
2011; Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015; Adams and Klobodu, 2016). 
As a broader definition, North (1990), describes institutions as a set of  formal and infor-
mal rules, in which political, social and economic relations are based. According to the 
OECD (2014, p.2), institutions “define how power is managed and used, how states and 
societies arrive at decisions, and how they implement those decisions and measure and ac-
count for the results.”. Institutions depend therefore on how decentralised and democratic 
the decisions processes are (OECD, 2014).  
The quality of  the institutions may threaten countries’ economic growth. Therefore, insti-
tutions have a strong impact on financial liberalization and development (de Haan and 
Sturm, 2017). Institutions include laws, rules, informal rules regarding social interactions 
and government organisms and entities and they can be distinguished by two kinds: 1) 
formal, which embraces, for instance, laws, constitutions, property rights, contracts; and 2) 
informal, other rules that influence citizens behaviour (for example, traditions, customs, 
sanctions, conduct codes) (North, 1991; OECD, 2014).  
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Corruption is the usage of  public power in an abusive way (Leff, 1964; Rose-Ackerman, 
1975; Treisman, 2000; Bjørnskov, 2011; Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015). There is no con-
sensus regarding whether corruption is a concept that should be used only regarding public 
domain or if  it plausible to use it concerning also the private one (Madsen, 2013). In this 
study, the concept of  corruption will be used in its traditional and more often used stance, 
as the abuse of  public power for private gain (Treisman, 2000). 
Since the 1990s decade, corruption has been the aim of  a plethora of  studies as it might 
pervert government spending, undermining investment in education (Mauro, 1998; 
Bjørnskov, 2011), slowing economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Bjørnskov, 2011), harming hu-
man welfare (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005; Bjørnskov, 2011), and resulting in 
losses of  productivity (Méon and Weill, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2011) and income (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005; Bjørnskov, 2011).  
Corruption distorts public services use and consequently reduces citizens’ satisfaction (Park 
and Blenkinsopp, 2011). Specifically, poorer groups are the most disadvantaged as they 
depend mainly on public services (Peiffer and Rose, 2018). Corruption tends to harm the 
more vulnerable hampering their access to services, health, education or justice (Knox, 
2009; Peiffer and Rose, 2018). In a broader perspective, corruption undermines trust on 
governments’ actions, interfering with FDI and jeopardizing economic growth, job crea-
tion, human capital and opportunities.7  
Defining the activities considered as corruption is usually prone to confusion. As a matter 
of  fact, theft and fraud are commonly associated with corruption. However, according to 
Senior (2006), corruption entails three parties: the corruptor, the corruptee and the others 
who benefit or not from the consequences of  the corruption act, while theft and fraud 
only involves two, the stealer and who is stolen. As stated by Jain (2001), other activities 
such as drug trades, black market, money laundering cannot be considered corruption as 
long as they do not include public power. 
Indeed, according to Jain (2001), there are three typical dimensions of  corruption in demo-
cratic societies: 1) Grand corruption, which refers to the exploitation of  political power in 
their own benefit at the expense of  the citizens. In this case, resources are allocated where 
political elite gains are higher rather than where they are the most needed for the popula-
                                                          
7 In http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption accessed on the 6th October 
2018. 
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tion in general; 2) Bureaucratic corruption entails acts of  the bureaucrats across their rela-
tions with superiors or the public. In most often cases, bureaucrats are bribed by the public 
to accelerate a bureaucratic process or to receive a service not available for the community 
in general; 3) Legislative corruption, encompassing how legislators can be persuaded to 
approve legislation that favours specific interest groups.  
In conclusion, when institutions are weak and/or when corruption plays a preponderant 
role in a country’s society, only the powerful segments of  society have privileged access to 
finance and so financial development might wide income disparities (Chong and Gradstein, 
2007; Adams and Klobodu, 2016; de Haan and Sturm, 2017; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and 
Mahalik, 2017). In contrast, in the presence of  a strong institutional environment, it is 
probable that financial development reduces income inequality as it is easier for the poorer 
to invest on physical and human capital due to a broader access to finance (de Haan and 
Sturm, 2017; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik, 2017). 
Keeping in mind the direct impact of  financial liberalization/development on income ine-
quality, we put forward an additional hypothesis: 
H3: In contexts characterized by high levels of  corruption (low institutional quality), the impact 
of  financial liberalization/development on increased income inequality tends to be amplified. 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms that link financial liberalization/development to income inequality and the 
mediating effect of  corruption 
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Note: “+” and “-” mean an increase or decrease, respectively, on income inequalities. 
 
 
2.5. Empirical evidence  
2.5.1. Financial liberalization 
Empirical studies concerning the effect of  financial liberalization on income inequality (e.g. 
Ang, 2010; Agnello, Mallick and Sousa, 2012; Bumman and Lensink, 2016) leave an open 
debate (see Table 3).  
Focusing on researches based on panel data models, Batuo and Asongu (2015), for a sam-
ple of  28 African countries between 1996-2010, Naceur and Zhang (143 countries since 
1961 until 2011), de Haan and Sturm (2017) and de Haan, Pleninger and Sturm (2017), 
analysing 121 and 141 countries, respectively, both during the period of  1975-2005, con-
cluded, with significance at 1% level, that financial liberalization increases income dispari-
ties. Within the line of  thought of  the authors, the reduction of  financing costs induced by 
financial liberalization does not broad the financial markets access to the poorest and mar-
ket imperfections are not reduced as expected. Therefore, they will not have incentives to 
invest in education and business, contributing to income divergences.  
Also resorting to panel data models, Bumman and Lensink (2016) achieved identical re-
sults, that is, financial liberalization increases income inequalities, at 5% statistical signifi-
cance. However, according to these authors, financial liberalization might have a reducing 
effect for high levels of  financial depth (private credit over GDP), that is, when financial 
depth is higher than 25%. Notwithstanding, as in most developing countries financial 
depth is low, and this threshold is not achieved, financial liberalization is more likely to rise 
income divergences. 
In contrast, albeit using the same methodology, Agnello, Mallick and Sousa (2012), studying 
a sample of  18 Asian countries between 1996 and 2005 and Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis 
(2014) for 91 countries, during the same period, concluded that financial liberalization 
shortens income disparities, at 5% significance level. Furthermore, Li and Yu (2014) for 62 
countries during the 1973-2005 period reached the same conclusion but at 10% signifi-
cance level. According to the authors, this is due to a better and easier access to credit by 
the poorer. 
Differently from previous studies that analyse large samples of  countries, Ang (2010) anal-
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yses the effect of  financial liberalization in India’s income inequalities, between 1951 and 
2004, employing a time series data model. The results suggest that income inequalities 
worsened with the financial liberalization process during this period (with significance at 
1% level). This conclusion, according to the author, owes to the fact that as India is a huge 
developing country with a large proportion of  poor people, structural adjustments that 
depend on the allocation of  financial resources are more likely to hurt the poorest. 
 
2.5.2. Financial development 
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of  financial development on income inequali-
ty involves also an intense debate (see Table 3).  
Focusing on panel data methods, Jauch and Watzka (2015), analysing 138 countries since 
1960 until 2008, Adams and Klobodu (2016), for a panel of  21 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries between 1985-2011, and de Haan and Sturm (2017) (121 countries during 1975-2005), 
concluded that financial development exacerbates income divergences, at 1% significance 
level. The authors suggest that this is because more developed markets tend to benefit the 
rich rather than the poor due to the latter’s financial illiteracy. 
In contrast, but using the same econometric methodology, Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012), 
studying 126 countries during the period 1963-2002, Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015), ana-
lysing 30 Commonwealth countries between 1995-2008, and Naceur and Zhang (2016) 
(143 countries during 1961-2011) found that income inequalities are mitigated with the 
process of  financial development, at 1% significance level. In the authors’ view, these re-
sults are due to the expansion of  the financial markets access, improving the access to the 
poorest. 
Some empirical studies also use time series methods. For instance, Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, 
and Mahalik (2017), investigating the impact of  financial development on Kazakhstan’s 
income inequality, between 1990 and 2014, demonstrated (at 10% significance level) that 
financial development wides income disparities due to financial market inefficiency. In op-
position, Ang (2010), analysing India during the period of  1951-2004, concluded that fi-
nancial development narrows income inequalities as it reduces financial frictions and eases 
the access to financial markets (at 1% significance level). 
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Table 3: The impact of  financial liberalization/development on income inequality: empirical evidence 
Study Observations Period Methodology 
Dependent var.: 
Income inequality 
Core independent vars. Other vars.  Impact of  FL/FD on II 
Financial liberalization Financial development Corruption Other 
Financial 
liberaliza-
tion 
Financial 
develop-
ment 
Ang (2010) India 1951-2004 
Annual time series data 
(ECM cointegration test; 
ARDL bounds test) 
Gross income Gini 
Demetriades and Luintel 
(1996, 1997) Financial 
liberalization measure. 
Private credit over 
GDP; M3-M1 over 
GDP; Commercial 
banks assets over 
commercial banks 
assets plus Central 
Banks assets; Bank 
density 
 
Rate of  growth of  real 
GDP per capita; Inflation 
rate; Trade openness 
+++ --- 
Shahbaz, 
Bhattacharya, 
and Mahalik 
(2017) 
Kazakhstan 1990-2014 
Annual time series data 
(ARDL bounds test) 
Gross income Gini  
Private credit over 
GDP. 
 
Economic growth; FDI; 
Education, Democracy 
 + 
Li and Yu 
(2014) 
18 Asian coun-
tries 
1996-2005 
Panel data (GMM) 
Fixed effects 
Gross income Gini 
Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2009) financial 
liberalization index. 
  
Human Capital Institu-
tional quality; Inflation; 
GDP growth rate per 
capita; Other variables 
-  
Adams and 
Klobodu 
(2016) 
21 sub-Saharan 
African coun-
tries 
1985-2011 
Panel data (PMG, MG, 
DFE); 
Fixed effects 
Panel Unit root test 
 
Net income Gini  
Private credit over 
GDP; Deposit money 
over central bank 
assets. 
Control of  
corruption 
index from 
Internation-
al Country 
Risk Guide 
(ICRG) 
GDP per capita; Williams’ 
(2011) transparency index 
 +++ 
Batuo and 
Asongu, 
(2015) 
28 African 
Countries 
1996-2010 
Before and after compari-
son; Panel data (GMM) 
Dynamic panel model 
Gross income Gini 
De jure Chinn and Ito (2008) 
capital account openness 
index (KAOPEN) and de 
facto capital account open-
ness (foreign direct invest-
ment: FDI as percentage of  
GDP) 
  
Trade liberalization; 
Institutional and political 
liberalization; Other 
liberalizations; Govern-
ment expenditure; Infla-
tion; Economic prosperity 
+++  
Batabyal and 
Chowdhury 
(2015) 
30 common-
wealth countries 
1995-2008 
Panel data (IV), OLS 
 
Gross income Gini  
Private credit over 
GDP; M2 over GDP. 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index (CPI) 
GDP growth; Primary 
completion rate; Listed 
companies market capital-
ization; Real interest rate; 
Openness   
 --- 
Agnello, 
Mallick and 
Sousa (2014) 
62 countries 1973-2005 
Panel data  
Fixed effects 
Net income Gini 
Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2009) financial 
liberalization index. 
  
Credit controls; Entry 
barriers; Banking supervi-
sion; Other variables 
--  
Delis, Hasan 
and Kazakis 
(2014) 
91 countries 1973-2005 
Panel data (GMM), OLS, 
2SLS 
Dynamic panel model  
Fixed effects 
Random effects 
Gross income Gini 
Wage inequality 
measured by Theil 
Index 
Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2009) financial 
liberalization index. 
  
Lagged income inequality; 
Macroeconomic, institu-
tional, demographic and 
financial variables 
--  
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(…) 
Study Observations Period Methodology 
Dependent var.: 
Income inequality 
Core independent vars. Other vars.  Impact of  FL/FD on II 
Financial liberalization 
Financial 
development 
Corruption Other 
Financial 
liberaliza-
tion 
Financial 
develop-
ment 
Bumann and 
Lensink 
(2016) 
106 countries 1973-2008 
Panel data (GMM) 
Fixed effects 
Gross income Gini 
Chinn and Ito (2008) capital 
account openness index 
(KAOPEN) and FDI as 
percentage of  GDP. 
Private credit 
over GDP. 
 
Lagged income inequality; 
Inflation; Trade openness; 
Secondary school enrolment; 
Age structure; Population 
growth; Real GDP per capita 
growth 
++  
Bumann and 
Lensink 
(2016) 
106 countries 1973-2008 
Panel data (GMM) 
Fixed effects 
Gross income Gini 
Chinn and Ito (2008) capital 
account openness index 
(KAOPEN) and FDI as 
percentage of  GDP. 
Private credit 
over GDP. 
 
Lagged income inequality; 
Inflation; Trade openness; 
Secondary school enrolment; 
Age structure; Population 
growth; Real GDP per capita 
growth 
-- If  finan-
cial depth 
over than 
25%. 
 
de Haan and 
Sturm (2017) 
121 countries 1975-2005 
Panel data (GLS, G2SLS) 
Fixed effects 
Random effects 
Dynamic panel model 
Cross-country regression 
(OLS) 
Gross income Gini 
Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2009) financial 
liberalization index. 
Private credit 
over GDP. 
 
Banking crises; Inflation; 
GDP growth; Agriculture 
added value; Other variables 
+++ +++ 
Hamori and 
Hashiguchi 
(2012) 
126 countries 1963-2002 
Panel data (GMM) 
Dynamic panel model 
Fixed Effects 
Estimated household 
income inequality 
 
Private credit 
over GDP; 
M2 over GDP. 
 
Trade openness; GDP per 
capita; Inflation rate 
 --- 
Jauch and 
Watzka (2015) 
138 countries 1960-2008 
Panel data (GMM) 
Dynamic panel model 
Fixed Effects  
Pooled OLS  
Gross income Gini 
Net income Gini 
 
Private credit 
over GDP. 
 
GDP per capita; Inflation; 
Government consumption; 
Agricultural sector value 
added; Access to finance; 
Ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion 
 +++ 
de Haan, 
Pleninger, and 
Sturm (2017) 
141 countries 1975-2005 
Panel data (GLS) 
Fixed effects 
Gross income Gini 
Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2009) financial 
liberalization index and 
Chinn and Ito (2008) capital 
account openness index. 
Private credit 
over GDP. 
 
Inflation; GDP growth; 
Agriculture added value; 
Other variables 
+++  
Naceur and 
Zhang (2016) 
143 countries 1961-2011 IV Gross income Gini 
Abiad, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2009) financial 
liberalization index and BIS 
consolidated foreign claims 
to GDP. 
Private credit 
over GDP; 
Stock market 
total value 
traded to 
GDP 
 
GDP per capita; Inflation; 
Trade openness; Government 
size 
+++ --- 
Note: “+” and “-” mean an increase or decrease, respectively, on income inequality (II). “+++”/ ”---”, “++”/ ”--” and “+”/ ”-” stands for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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3. Methodology  
3.1. Main hypotheses and the choice of  the methodology 
Three methodological approaches are typically employed in literature (Babbie, 2011; Cre-
swell, 2014): quantitative, qualitative and mixed. According to Creswell (2014), quantitative 
methods are employed in order to test objective theories analysing causality such as impact 
measurement between variables, which are converted into proxies and analysed by statisti-
cal procedures (Babbie, 2011).  
Extant literature in this field of  study usually resorts to quantitative methods, namely panel 
data models (e.g, Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Li and Yu, 2014; Batuo and Asongu, 2015; 
Jauch and Watzka 2015; Bumman and Lensink, 2016; Adams and Klobodu, 2016) or time 
series data analyses (Ang, 2010; Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik, 2017).  
Following the approach of  most existing studies (Agnello, Mallick and Sousa, 2014; Delis, 
Hasan and Kazakis, 2014; Bumman and Lensink, 2016; Adams and Klobodu, 2016; de 
Haan, Pleninger, and Sturm, 2017), and given the aim of  the present study (to assess the 
impact of  financial liberalization/development on income inequality, mediated by coun-
tries’ corruption level), we employ a quantitative approach, in specific a panel data model 
estimation technique (analysing a sample of  countries over a period of  time).  
According to Batuo and Asongu (2015) and de Haan and Sturm (2017), in comparison 
with cross section regressions, panel data techniques have the advantage of  analysing data 
time series and cross section variations. Furthermore, they enable to control countries’ un-
observed specific effects and are not biased by endogeneity as regressors’ lagged values are 
employed as instrumental variables (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2007; Kunieda, 
Okada, and Shibata, 2014; Jauch and Watzka, 2015).  
In specific, the present study’s panel data model will control for country’s fixed effects, 
purging time-invariant variables and decreasing the bias of  omitted variables (Delis, Hasan 
and Kazakis, 2014; Jauch and Watzka, 2015). 
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3.2. Econometric specification  
To test the proposed hypotheses, we formulate the following econometric model: 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗 = 𝛽0
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑗
, 
Where:  
j stands for the corruption group index (j=0: All countries; j=1: High corruption/low transparency countries 
(𝐶𝑃𝐼 < 40); j=2: Middle corruption/transparency countries (40 ≤ 𝐶𝑃𝐼 < 60); j=3: Low corruption/ High transparency 
countries (𝐶𝑃𝐼 ≥ 60); 
i stands for the country index (i=1, …127); 
t stands for the time index (t=2000, … 2017); 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 stands for income inequality; 
𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 represent financial liberalization and financial development variables; 
𝛸𝑖𝑡 is a vector of  control variables (which includes real GDP per capita growth rate, rate of  
inflation and trade openness); 
µ𝑖𝑡 denotes the random error term. 
 
The estimation of  the models according to countries’ corruption groups enables to interact 
the variables of  financial liberalization and financial development with the corruption vari-
able. The estimation of  the models including interaction variables (𝐹𝐿 × 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐹𝐷 × 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡) was not feasible due to severe multicollinearity issues. 
 
3.3. Data sources and variables’ main proxies  
Income inequality is measured by gross income Gini (as employed by, for example, Li and 
Yu, 2014; Delis, Hasan and Kazakis, 2014; Batuo and Asongu, 2015; Bumann and Lensink, 
2016; Naceur and Zhang, 2016; de Haan and Sturm, 2017), i.e., before redistribution poli-
cies, not being influenced, as net income Gini is, by government’s taxes and transfers (de 
Haan and Sturm, 2017). According to Jauch and Watzka, 2015, (pp. 296-297), redistribution 
policies may “blur the theoretical relationship between financial development and income 
inequality, which is modelled without an explicit role for redistribution”. 
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Regarding independent variables, financial liberalization is proxied by a de facto capital ac-
count openness measure (FDI as percentage of  GDP), as done by Jaumotte, Lall and Pa-
pageorgiou (2013), Batuo and Asongu (2015) and Bumman and Lensink (2016). According 
to Batuo and Asongu (2015), it is a measure that reflects the cross-border capital variations, 
it is not influenced by how the private sector avoids capital account restrictions and be-
cause other measures (such as Chinn and Ito, 2008 capital account openness index) reflect 
some countries’ de jure closeness but not their de facto capital openness (Patnaik and Shah, 
2010), that is, capital controls reduction in accordance with Bumann and Lensink (2016), 
which is a strand of  financial liberalization. The higher the ratio of  FDI on GDP, the high-
er the level of  financial liberalization. 
In order to measure financial development, we use the most common indicator in litera-
ture: private credit over GDP (see, for instance, Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Jauch and 
Watzka, 2015; Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015; Naceur and Zhang, 2016; Bumann and 
Lensink, 2016; Adams and Klobodu, 2016, de Haan and Sturm, 2017) because it is a proxy 
that reflects the extent to which the private sector can get credit (Batabyal and Chowdhury, 
2015), it captures the society’s savings that are received by private firms (de Haan and 
Sturm, 2017) and because income inequality is impacted by finance through the banking 
sector and not by capital market capitalization as proxied by the monetization ratio measure 
(M2 over GDP) used in another studies (Naceur and Zhang, 2016; de Haan and Sturm, 
2017). Therefore, if  individuals have an easier access to credit markets, then there is a high-
er level of  financial development (Jauch and Watzka, 2015).  
The corruption variable is constructed based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
which is an aggregate indicator that sorts countries according to the corruption level 
among politicians, public officials and civil employees (Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015). 
The CPI ranking is from 0 to 100, the lower the value, the more corrupt the country is.  
Our control variables include the three most used control variables in the literature: 1) real 
GDP per capita growth rate. Literature is not consensual about using real GDP per capita 
growth rate (Li and Yu, 2014; Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015; Bumman and Lensink, 2016, 
de Haan, Pleninger and Sturm, 2017) or real GDP per capita (Jauch and Watzka, 2015; 
Naceur and Zhang, 2016). Guided by most of  this related literature, we chose to use real 
GDP per capita growth as control variable. It is expected that income inequalities reduce 
with increases in this variable (Ang, 2010; Li and Yu, 2014; Adams and Klobodu, 2016, de 
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Haan and Sturm, 2017); 2)  rate of  inflation - it is expected that an increase in the inflation 
rate will increase income disparities (Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Li and Yu, 2014; 
Bumman and Lensink, 2016; Naceur and Zhang, 2016); 3) Trade openness (Ang, 2010; 
Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Bumann and Lensink, 2016; Naceur and Zhang, 2016) -  it 
is expected that higher trade openness induce a lower value of  income inequalities as more 
work opportunities are created for the citizens (Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Naceur and 
Zhang, 2016). Trade openness is measured by the ratio of  the sum between imports and 
exports and GDP.  
Data concerning Gini index, financial liberalization, financial development, GDP per capita 
growth rate, inflation growth rate and trade openness is gathered from the World Devel-
opment Indicator (WDI), a database developed by the World Bank that publishes compa-
rable information among countries (Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012), while data respecting 
corruption is collected from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Trans-
parency International, following Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015).  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Although data collected from the World Bank and Transparency International included 
initially 230 countries, the existence of  missing values for the relevant variables in almost 
the whole period in analysis undermined the use of  such a large sample. Thus, for period 
2000-2017, the final sample includes 127 countries.  
The Gini Index, which is the proxy for countries’ income inequality (the dependent varia-
ble), presents a mean value of  approximately 37.7 (see Table 4), with Azerbaijan being the 
least unequal country, in 2004, with a Gini index of  16.2 and South Africa, in 2005, being 
the most unequal country (Gini index = 64.8). 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Proxy Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Income 
inequality 
Gini Index  
[0: perfect equality; 1: perfect inequality] 
988 37.69 9.16 16.2 64.8 
Financial 
liberalization 
Net inflows of  foreign direct investment in 
GDP, %  
[high values correspond to high financial liberalization] 
2262 5.97 18.87 -58.32 451.72 
External account restrictions analysed on 4 
IMF’s AREAER categories  
[high values correspond to more open financial regimes] 
2072 0.45 1.60 -1.91 2.36 
Financial 
development 
Domestic credit provided by the financial 
sector in GDP, %  
[high values correspond to high financial development] 
2136 64.07 58.91 -70.38 316.61 
Money and quasi money in GDP, %  
[high values correspond to high financial development] 
1580 47.35 31.46 1.62 222.93 
Transparency 
index 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)  
[0: low transparency/high corruption; 100: high trans-
parency/low corruption] 
2061 42.72 20.98 4 99 
GDPpc 
growth 
GDP per capita, annual growth rate, in % 2280 2.56 4.72 -38.71 58.17 
Inflation 
Relative variation of  the Consumer Price 
index, in % 
2209 6.79 18.26 -18.11 513.91 
Trade open-
ness 
(Imports + Exports)/ GDP, in % 2234 86.75 45.67 16.95 423.99 
Note: AREAER - Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
The indicator of  “financial liberalization”, the net inflows of  foreign direct investment in 
GDP (FDI/GDP), which includes long-term and short-term capitals, equity capital and 
reinvestment of  earnings,8 has a mean value of  5.97%, observing its minimum (-58.32%) 
for Luxembourg in 2007 and a maximum of  451.72% for Malta in 2007.   
The other financial liberalization indicator, the Chinn and Ito (2008) Index (KAOPEN), is 
                                                          
8 In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS, accessed on the 17th February 2019. 
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an index that proxies the degree of  capital account openness (a financial liberalization 
strand, according to Bumann and Lensink, 2016), its extensity and strength by measuring 
four categories of  restrictions on external accounts from the IMF’s Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) (Chinn and Ito, 2008). These 
categories include: current and capital account transactions restrictions, presence of  multi-
ple exchanges rates and the surrender of  exports proceeds requirement. This proxy pre-
sents a mean value of  0.45, with a minimum value of  -1.91 for a wide set of  countries,9 
indicating that these countries present low levels of  financial liberalization, and a maximum 
of  2.36 for a large number of  countries and years,10 reflecting high levels of  financial liber-
alization. 
Values for the proxy of  financial development private credit in total GDP indicate a mean 
of  64.1%, a minimum value -70.38% (Botswana, in 2001) and a maximum 316.61% (Cy-
prus, in 2012). These values suggest that the amount of  domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector (monetary authorities, deposit money banks and other financial corpora-
tions – i.e. finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension 
funds and foreign exchange companies11) in a gross basis to various sectors and net to the 
Central Government, in Cyprus, in 2012, was around 316% of  this country’s GDP, while 
for Botswana it achieves a negative value of  around 70%12.  
The other financial development indicator, the monetization ratio (money and quasi money 
as percentage of  GDP), which includes currency, demand deposits and term deposits, pre-
sents 47.35% as the mean value, with Democratic Republic of  Congo (in 2001) being the 
country with the lowest level of  financial development (1.62%) and Cyprus the most finan-
cially developed country with the monetization ration reaching 222.93% in 2007.13 
                                                          
9 Namely, Angola, Belarus, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Iran, Malawi, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Tajiki-
stan, Ukraine, Venezuela for several years. 
10 Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, South Korea, Latvia, Liberia, 
Lithuania, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, and 
Zambia. 
11 In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS?end=2017&start=2000, accessed on the 
17th February. 
12 This negative value may be due to the fact that some countries have their international reserves deposits in 
private banking system and not in Central Bank. Claims on the Central Government are net – credit on the 
Central Government minus Central Government deposits – hence, this ratio might be negative for the do-
mestic credit supplied by the banking system (in https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS?end=2017&start=2000, accessed on the 15th March). 
13 Cyprus’ high monetization ratio value in 2007 may be due to the fact that, in that year, the Central Bank of  
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The corruption perception index (CPI) is an indicator which ranges between 0 (highly cor-
rupt) and 100 (highly transparent). It presents a wide variation in our sample, from the low-
est value of  4 for Bangladesh (in 2001), the least transparent (or most corrupt) country, to 
99 for the most transparent (or less corrupt) country, Finland (in 2001).  
In order to account for the mediating effect of  corruption on income inequality, countries 
were grouped into three main categories, low transparency countries (CPI below 40), mid-
dle transparency countries (CPI higher or equal to 40 and below 60) – subdivided into 
three subsamples, middle high if  the country presents the biggest sample of  years with a 
high CPI, middle for the biggest number of  years with a middle CPI and middle low in the 
case of  a low CPI for a bigger amount of  years – and high transparency countries (CPI 
higher or equal to 60) (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Countries by groups of  transparency 
Category Country 
Number of 
valid obser-
vations 
Missing 
values 
High transparency country  
(CPI≥ 60) 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Chile; Den-
mark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Ice-
land; Ireland; Israel; Luxembourg; Netherlands; 
Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; 
United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay 
412 2 
Middle trans-
parency coun-
try 
(40≤CPI<60) 
Middle high Botswana; Cyprus; Slovenia 
498 24 Middle 
Bhutan; Costa Rica; Czech Republic; Greece; 
Hungary; Italy; Jordan; Korea, Rep.; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Namibia; 
Slovak Republic; South Africa; Tunisia 
Middle low 
Brazil; Bulgaria; Croatia; Georgia; Ghana; Mon-
tenegro; Romania; Rwanda; Turkey 
Low transparency country 
(CPI<40) 
Albania; Angola; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bangla-
desh; Belarus; Benin; Bolivia; Bosnia and Her-
zegovina; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; 
Chad; Colombia; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; 
Congo,Rep.; Coted'Ivoire; Dominican Republic; 
Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Salvador; Eswati-
ni; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia,The; Guatemala; 
Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Honduras; 
Iran,IslamicRep.; Iraq; Kazakhstan; Kenya; 
Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Lesotho; 
Liberia; Macedonia, FYR; Madagascar; Malawi; 
Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Mexico; Moldova; 
Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; Nica-
ragua; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Panama; Para-
guay; Peru; Russian Federation; Senegal; Sierra 
Leone; Solomon Islands; SriLanka; Tajikistan; 
Tanzania; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Togo; Tonga; 
Uganda; Ukraine; Venezuela,RB; Vietnam; 
Yemen, Rep.; Zambia 
1150 200 
Note: CPI – Corruption Perception Index. See Table A1 in Annex for details. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cyprus reduced the official interest rates by 50 basis points and the minimum reserve ratio, increasing the 
money expansion (Syrichas, 2008). 
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Regarding control variables, inflation presents the widest variation, with Bhutan, in 2004, 
presenting the lowest value, -18,11% (deflation), while the Democratic Republic of  Congo, 
in 2000, experiencing hyperinflation with a variation in inflation of  513, 91%. The mean 
value for the whole sample is 6,8%.  
In terms of  growth dynamics, the mean value for the real GDP per capita growth is 4,72%. 
GDP per capita growth reached its lowest in 2015 for Yemen (-38.71%) and the maximum 
for Timor-Leste, in 2004 (58,17%). 
Finally, trade openness (the sum of  exports and imports in total GDP) presents a mean 
value of  86.75%, with Timor-Leste, in 2016, being the most closed country with a ratio of  
16.95%, and Luxembourg, in 2017, the most trade open country, with a ratio of  424%.  
Over the period in analysis, the average income inequality is decreasing (Figure 2a), with the 
group of  the most transparent countries being generally less unequal and the most corrupt 
the one that presents a higher average income inequality (see Figure 2b). 
  
a) b) 
Figure 2: Gini index, global and by countries’ transparency group, 2000-2017 
Note: The outlier value of  the average Gini index of  the most transparent countries is influenced in 2002 by Botswana’s figure (64.7). 
Legend: 4 – Low transparency countries; 40 – Middle transparency countries; 60 – High transparency countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Bank Indicators and Transparency International, 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017  
The net foreign direct investment inflows in GDP (FL1) presents an irregular/volatile 
trend, observing steep increases in the first half  of  the 2000s and between 2008-2010 (Fig-
ure 3a) and noticeable downward trends between 2007-2009 and 2012-2014. The volatility 
of  this indicator is particularly strong in middle and highly transparent countries, (Figure 
3b).  
The Chinn and Ito Index (2008) (FL2) is less volatile than FDI/GDP indicator, reflecting a 
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global upward trend between 2000 and 2017, but experiencing a decline after 2006 (see 
Figure 3c). By transparency groups, the most transparent countries present higher (average) 
financial liberalization, which contrasts with the lowest financial liberalization by the most 
corrupt countries (Figure 3d). 
  
a) b) 
Financial liberalization proxied by FDI/GDP (FL1) 
  
c) d) 
Financial liberalization proxied by Chinn and Ito Index, 2008 (FL2) 
Figure 3: Financial liberalization, 2000-2017 
Legend: 4 – Low transparency countries; 40 – Middle transparency countries; 60 – High transparency countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Bank Indicators. In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
Regarding financial development, both indicators, i.e., the ratio of  the private credit over 
GDP (FD1) and the monetization ratio (FD2), present upward trends both for the whole 
sample and by transparency group (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, the first indicator shows a 
short decrease since 2015, especially for the middle and highly transparent groups (Figure 
4a, b). As in the case of  financial liberalization, the most transparent countries have the 
highest (average) levels of  financial development, whilst the most corrupt countries present 
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the lowest. 
 
  
a) b) 
Financial development proxied by Private credit/GDP (FD1) 
  
c) d) 
Financial development proxied by the Monetization ratio (FD2) 
Figure 4: Financial development, 2000-2017 
Legend: 4 – Low transparency countries; 40 – Middle transparency countries; 60 – High transparency countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Bank Indicators. In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS?end=2017&start=2002 
https://datamarket.com/data/set/148p/money-and-quasi-money-m2-as-of-gdp 
 
It is evident the sharp deceleration of  the real GDP per capita between 2000 and 2017 with 
the real GDP per capita declining in the period of  the “World Financial Crisis”. Such trend 
is shared by all the countries in analysis, being the decline more pronounced in the case of  
the high and middle transparent countries (see Figure 5).  
30 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5: GDP per capita growth, 2000-2017 
Legend: 4 – Low transparency countries; 40 – Middle transparency countries; 60 – High transparency countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Bank Indicators. In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end=2017&start=2002 
 
 
Excluding the financial crisis period, trade openness presents a clear upward trend (Figure 
6a). The middle transparent countries have the highest (average) level of  trade openness, 
followed by the group of  the highest transparent countries. The least transparent countries 
are significantly less open to trade (Figure 6b). 
  
a) b) 
Figure 6: Trade openness, 2000-2017 
Legend: 4 – Low transparency countries; 40 – Middle transparency countries; 60 – High transparency countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Bank Indicators. In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?end=2017&start=2002 
 
Inflation presents a clear downward trend when we look to the begin and end years (Figure 
7a), with the group of  more corrupt countries presenting the highest inflation rates where-
as the less corrupt observe low inflation rates. 
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a) b) 
Figure 7: Inflation, 2000-2017 
Legend: 4 – Low transparency countries; 40 – Middle transparency countries; 60 – High transparency countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Bank Indicators. In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?end=2017&start=2002 
 
Considering the bivariate correlations between the relevant variables (see Table 6), we ob-
serve that on average more unequal countries (higher Gini indexes) are associated with 
lower levels of  financial liberalization and, especially, financial development. Moreover, 
more corrupt and less trade open countries tend to be more (income) unequal. The rate of  
inflation and GDP per capital growth are associated with higher levels of  income inequality 
but the estimated coefficients are small.  
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the database’s variables. 
Table 6: Correlation matrix 
Variable Gini 
Finan. Lib. 
(FDI/GDP) 
Finan. Dev. 
(PC/GDP) 
CPI 
GDPpc 
growth 
Inflation 
Trade 
Open. 
Gini 1.0000       
Finan. Lib. 
(FDI/GDP) 
-0.1133 1.0000      
Finan. Dev. 
(PC/GDP) 
-0.3094 0.1308 1.0000     
CPI -0.3969 0.0984 0.7271 1.0000    
GDPpc 
growth 
0.0310 0.0359 -0.3223 -0.2323 1.0000   
Inflation 0.0814 -0.0232 -0.2033 -0.2096 0.0576 1.0000  
Trade 
Open. 
-0.3049 0.3607 0.2158 0.2020 0.0695 0.0057 1.0000 
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4.2. The impact of  financial liberalization and development on income inequality: 
empirical results 
The estimations for the impact of  financial liberalization and development on income ine-
quality are presented in Table 7.14 We estimated four main set of  models: 1) Models A - for 
All countries; 2) Models B - Low transparency /High corruption countries (CPI<40); 3) 
Models C - Middle transparency /Middle corruption countries (40≤CPI<60); and 4) Mod-
els D - High transparency /Low corruption countries (CPI≥60). For each group of  models, 
we estimated four models that combined the two alternative proxies for each indicator of  
financial liberalization (FL1: FDI/GDP and FL2: Chinn and Ito (2008) Index (KAOPEN)) 
and financial development (FD1: private credit/GDP and FD2: the monetization ratio). 
Diagnosis tests, based on Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test, indicate the data in some 
models (A1-A3, C2, D1-D4) are heteroscedastic (see Table 7). Albeit regression analysis 
using heteroscedastic data will still provide an unbiased estimate for the relationship be-
tween the predictor variables and the outcome (inequality), the standard errors and there-
fore inferences obtained from data analysis are not to be trusted. Thus, in these cases we 
correct for heteroscedasticity computing robust errors. Additionally, the Variance Impact 
Factors (VIF) estimates evidence how much the variance of  a regression coefficient is in-
flated due to multicollinearity in the model. The estimated VIF are very small (less than 
2.6), which indicates that no multicollinearity issues are present in our estimations (O’Brien, 
2007). 
With some few exceptions (Models A2, B4, D2 and D4), and based on the Hausman test, 
the bulk of  the models were estimated using fixed effect panel data models. 
 
4.2.1. All countries sample 
Results regarding the impact of  financial liberalization on income inequality are quite am-
biguous, depending critically how financial liberalization is measured.  
When analysing the sample that includes all countries (Models A1-A4), results are statisti-
cally significant only when measured by the Chinn and Ito (2008) index (Model A4), indi-
cating that countries that present higher levels of  financial liberalization are, on average, all 
                                                          
14 Filling the existing missing values by interpolation conveyed for some variables distinct results (see Table 
A2 in Annex). Thus, the interpretation of  the estimates is done here with the effective values for the relevant 
variables. 
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the remaining factors being kept constant, more unequal in terms of  income distribution. 
Accordingly, hypothesis 1 (Financial liberalization contributes to an increase in income inequality) is 
validated.  
This result is in line with the results of  several studies, namely Batuo and Asongu (2015) 
and Bumann and Lensink (2016), which used the same proxy we did (Chinn and Ito, 2008 
index) to measure financial liberalization in 28 African countries and in a sample of  106 
countries, respectively (Batuo and Asongu, 2015 have also resorted to the FDI/GDP indi-
cator achieving the same result). Using an alternative indicator, most notably the Abiad, 
Detragiache, and Tressel (2009) financial liberalization index, Naceur and Zhang (2016) and 
de Haan and Sturm (2017) also found that higher levels of  financial liberalization under-
mine income equality (respectively for a sample of  143 and 121 countries).15   
The escalating income divergences results obtained can be explained (in the line of  the 
arguments put forward by the above-mentioned studies) by the fact that banks might re-
strict lending to poorer households because they lack collateral, not benefiting from the 
reduction of  financing costs induced by financial liberalization. Such argument follows the 
Arestis and Caner’s (2004) access to credit and financial services channel/ mechanism. 
Moreover, it is likely that market imperfections are not reduced as expected, which convey 
more unequal income distributions (Batuo and Asoungu, 2015; Naceur and Zhang, 2016; 
de Haan and Sturm, 2017).  
Resorting to the same proxy of  financial liberalization, the Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel 
(2009) financial liberalization index, as the above studies, Agnello, Mallick and Sousa 
(2012), Li and Yu (2014), and Delis, Hasan and Kazakis (2014) found opposite results. Spe-
cifically, their estimations evidence that financial reforms have promoted a better income 
distribution both in a large sample of  countries (62 countries - Agnello, Mallick and Sousa 
(2012), and 91 countries - Delis, Hasan and Kazakis (2014)) and for a particular set of  ra-
ther homogeneous countries (18 Asian countries - Li and Yu (2014)). Li and Yu (2014) 
suggest that the poor can make use of  the funding created by financial reforms to reduce 
the gap to the richer, whereas Delis, Hasan and Kazakis (2014) argue that banking markets 
liberalization turns the access to credit easier for the poorer.  
                                                          
15
 The same result is found by Naceur and Zhang (2016) using another indicator of  financial liberalization, 
the BIS consolidated foreign claims to GDP. 
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Proxying financial liberalization by the FDI/GDP ratio did not permit to reach any conclu-
sive result about the impact of  financial liberalization on income inequalities. 
The contrasting results between the two indicators may be due to the fact that the latter is a 
de facto measure, whilst the former is a de jure one (as, according to Chinn and Ito (2008), 
p.9, their index “attempts to measure regulatory restrictions on capital account transac-
tions”). Therefore, as stated by Batuo and Asongu (2015), the Chinn and Ito (2008) index 
may not capture the flows and impacts of  cross border capitals, private sector might work 
around capital account restrictions and annul the regulatory capital controls effects and 
may not capture the fact that some countries have a de facto openness regardless its de jure 
closeness. Furthermore, the reforms accounted by the Chinn and Ito (2008) index are het-
erogenous among countries, which may be a possible reason why there is statistical evi-
dence that financial liberalization (measured by this index) impacts income inequality. In 
contrast, the worldwide globalized FDI flows are a common practice among countries, 
making them more homogenous, possibly explaining why the results regarding the impact 
of  financial liberalization proxied by the FDI/GDP ratio are statistically inconclusive.  
Regardless the proxy used (private credit/GDP or monetization ratio, respectively), the 
estimated coefficients associated to the financial development variable are negative and 
statistically significant (Models A3 and A4), suggesting that, ceteris paribus, financial devel-
opment has an income inequality reducing effect. Thus, our results do not validate H2 (Fi-
nancial development contributes to an increase in income inequality). Such result is, nevertheless, in 
line with the finance-income inequality narrowing hypothesis derived from the works of  
Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993). It is also consistent with the 
results obtained by several studies, namely those which involved a large set of  countries, 
such as Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012), Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015), and Naceur and 
Zhang (2016), which used the same proxies as we did. Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012), us-
ing a sample 126 countries, found that financial development shortened income inequality 
by increasing proportionally the real income of  the poorer rather than the richer due to the 
expansion of  financial markets. Focusing on 30 Commonwealth countries, and analysing 
them by subsamples of  low, middle- and high-income countries, Batabyal and Chowdhury 
(2015) concluded that financial development lessened income divergences for each group 
due to a better access to financial markets and services. Finally, Naceur and Zhang (2016), 
analysing 143 countries and measuring financial development by private credit over GDP 
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and stock market total value traded to GDP, also support the inequality-reducing effect 
arguing the poorer have an easier access to credit.  
Nonetheless, these results contrast with the ones achieved by Jauch and Watzka (2015), 
Adams and Klobodu (2016) and de Haan and Sturm (2017) (all studies proxied financial 
development by private credit over GDP in 138 countries, 28 Sub-Saharan countries and 
121 countries, respectively), which suggest that more developed financial markets may only 
benefit the richer due to the poorer financial illiteracy.   
Regarding countries’ transparency index, as expected, when statistically significant, more 
transparent countries tend, on average, to present lower levels of  income inequality (Mod-
els A1, A2, A4), regardless the proxy used to measure financial liberalization/development. 
This result is also found by Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015), for 30 Commonwealth coun-
tries, and Adams and Klobodu (2016), who analysed 21 Sub-Saharan African countries, 
concluding that the control of  corruption is needed to reduce income inequalities, in order 
to improve the poorer access to finance. 
 
4.2.2. The mediating effect of  corruption on the impact of  financial liberalization 
and development on income inequalities 
Separating countries by categories of  transparency (lower corruption) convey distinct esti-
mates for our core variables - financial liberalization and financial development. This sug-
gests that corruption is indeed a mediating factor on the impact of  financial liberaliza-
tion/development on income divergences.  
Again, as in the case of  all countries sample, financial liberalization results are ambiguous 
depending on the proxy used. In fact, when measured by the FDI/GDP ratio, financial 
liberalization tends to reduce income inequalities in high and middle corruption countries 
(Models B1 and C3), whereas when measured by the Chinn and Ito (2008) index, financial 
liberalization seems to exacerbate income inequalities for the high corruption countries 
(Models B2 and B4).  
Therefore, the impact of  financial liberalization (when measured by the Chinn and Ito, 
2008 index) on income inequalities is positively mediated by the corruption level, i.e., the 
increasing impact is amplified. Thus, H3 (In contexts characterized by high levels of  corruption (low 
institutional quality), the impact of  financial liberalization on increased income inequality tends to be am-
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plified) is validated. In contrast, when proxied by the FDI/GDP ratio, financial liberalization 
reduces income inequalities in contexts of  high corruption level which contradicts H3.  
These ambiguous results may possibly be due to the fact that the reforms accounted by the 
Chinn and Ito (2008) index are developed as financial sector general measures, maintaining 
the reduced probability of  poorer households benefiting from their impact as they lack 
collateral and cannot overcome financial market’s imperfections, exacerbating income di-
vergences. The FDI flows, however, may have a different impact as they are channelled to 
companies, possibly increasing directly employment in several society segments and, thus, 
decreasing the differences in income. 
Regarding financial development, the estimated coefficients present a statistically significant 
negative sign regardless the proxy used, and the group of  countries analysed (see Models 
B1-B4, C3 and C4). As such, hypothesis H3 (In contexts characterized by high levels of  corruption 
(low institutional quality), the impact of  financial development on increased income inequality tends to be 
amplified) is not verified, as financial development tend, on average, and all the remaining 
factors being held constant, to amplify the reduction of  income inequalities in the case of  
more corrupted context/ countries. Hence, although corruption do mediate the relation 
between financial development and income inequality, it does in a way that was not ex-
pected, as it is in highly corrupted contexts and not in highly transparent ones that financial 
development is more efficient in reducing income inequality.  
When comparing with other studies, the latter result contrasts with the one found by Ad-
ams and Klobodu (2016), who concluded that when countries have low levels of  corrup-
tion control (proxied by the control of  corruption index from International Country Risk 
Guide), financial development tends to wide income inequality. Furthermore, our result 
also contradicts Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015), a work that suggests that in contexts of  
high corruption (measured by the Corruption Perception Index), financial development 
accentuates income asymmetries, especially for low- and middle-income countries. When 
the level of  corruption is high, only a few society segments benefit from financial devel-
opment. However, it is possible that, due to the increase in the quality and quantity of  fi-
nancial services and the relaxation of  credit constraints induced by financial development, 
these segments may invest more in businesses increasing and improving employment and, 
consequently, reducing the asymmetries of  income, which might explain our divergent re-
sult. 
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Even when separating countries in groups of  transparency/corruption, within each group 
it is still the case that high levels of  corruption control are associated with low levels of  
income inequalities for both high and middle corruption countries’ groups (Models B1-B3, 
C1 and C2).   
In the specific case of  low corruption (high transparency) countries, there is no statistical 
evidence that financial liberalization/development impact income inequality. This result 
may be due to the fact that, as countries in this sample are relatively homogenous in what it 
concerns to financial liberalization/development policies, income differences might not be 
explained by these variables. This nevertheless reinforces our main result: countries’ cor-
ruption level has a mediating effect on the relationship between financial liberaliza-
tion/development and income inequality. 
Among control variables, inflation seems to be the one that has the most significant impact 
on income inequality, either for the all countries sample (Models A1-A4) or high corrup-
tion ones (Models B1-B4) with results indicating that inflation tends to fuel income dispari-
ties, as expected. In contexts characterized by higher levels of  transparency, there is no 
statistical evidence proving that this variable influences income inequality. Regarding GDP 
per capita growth and trade openness, both control variables present statistical evidence 
only in specific cases. The former seems to exacerbate income inequality in the whole sam-
ple (Model A4) and in the low corruption countries (Models D2 and D4), whilst the latter 
tends to attenuate income inequalities in high and low corruption contexts (Models B4 and 
D2). 
In a nutshell, our empirical results suggest that, in high and middle corruption contexts, the 
efforts by public authorities should be directed towards increasing the weight of  the FDI 
on GDP and the development of  the financial markets, by improving the private credit 
levels and the monetization ratio, if  the aim is to diminish income inequalities.  
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Table 7: Panel data estimations of  the determinants of  countries’ income inequality, 2000-2017  
 
All countries 
Low transparency /High corruption 
countries (CPI<40) 
Middle transparency /Middle corruption 
countries (40≤CPI<60) 
High transparency /Low corruption 
countries (CPI≥60) 
 
Model  
A1 
FL1, FD1 
Model  
A2 
FL2, FD1 
Model  
A3 
FL1, FD2 
Model  
A4 
FL2, FD2 
Model  
B1 
FL1, FD1 
Model  
B2 
FL2, FD1 
Model  
B3 
FL1, FD2 
Model  
B4 
FL2, FD2 
Model  
C1 
FL1, FD1 
Model  
C2 
FL2, FD1 
Model  
C3 
FL1, FD2 
Model  
C4 
FL2, FD2 
Model 
D1 
FL1, FD1 
Model 
D2 
FL2, FD1 
Model 
D3 
FL1, FD2 
Model 
D4 
FL2, FD2 
Financial Liberali-
zation (FL) 
-0.0001 
(0.0028) 
0.5262 
(0.3765) 
-0.0061 
(0.0130) 
0.5343*** 
(0.2044) 
-0.0567* 
(0.0320) 
0.6759** 
(0.2749) 
-0.0399 
(0.0428) 
0.9176***  
(0.2680) 
-0.0009 
(0.0037) 
-0.0238 
(0.3623) 
-0.0481** 
(0.0223) 
0.1839 
(0.4185) 
0.0046 
(0.0031) 
-0.5761 
(0.4399) 
-0.0030 
(0.0038) 
-0.2377 
(0.5901) 
Financial Devel-
opment (FD) 
-0.0076 
(0.0082) 
-0.0092 
(0.0086) 
-0.0529*** 
(0.0180) 
-0.0521*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0562*** 
 (0.0122) 
-0.0507*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0814*** 
(0.0217) 
-0.0784***  
(0.0196) 
-0.0147 
(0.0092) 
-0.0143 
(0.0164) 
-0.0435** 
(0.0214) 
-0.0411** 
(0.0212) 
0.0088 
(0.0066) 
0.0094 
(0.0069) 
0.0048 
(0.0202) 
-0.0048 
(0.0190) 
Transparency 
index 
-0.0884*** 
(0.0316) 
-0.0950*** 
(0.0329) 
-0.0608 
(0.0438) 
-0.0602** 
(0.0259) 
-0.1864*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.1501*** 
(0.0463) 
-0.1389*** 
 (0.0523) 
-0.0503  
(0.0514) 
-0.0812** 
(0.0329) 
-0.0831** 
(0.0382) 
-0.0624 
(0.0471) 
-0.0815 
(0.0510) 
-0.0375 
(0.0517) 
-0.0570 
(0.0536) 
-0.0258 
(0.0947) 
-0.1008 
(0.0858) 
GDP pc growth 
0.0346 
(0.0288) 
0.0410 
(0.0295) 
0.0464  
(0.0303) 
0.0517*  
(0.0317) 
0.0168 
(0.0420) 
0.0270 
(0.0453) 
0.0528  
(0.0449) 
0.0569 
(0.0461) 
-0.0041 
(0.0426) 
-0.0028 
(0.0472) 
0.0420 
(0.0521) 
0.0244 
(0.0527) 
0.0572 
(0.0375) 
0.1057*** 
(0.0371) 
0.0662 
(0.0439) 
0.0851** 
(0.0378) 
Inflation 
0.0290*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0319*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0285*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0309*** 
 (0.0085) 
0.0256** 
(0.0111) 
0.0274** 
 (0.0113) 
0.0288** 
 (0.0114) 
0.0316*** 
(0.0111) 
0.0096 
(0.0117) 
0.0093 
(0.0096) 
0.0072 
(0.0143) 
0.0061 
(0.0149) 
-0.0762 
(0.0834) 
-0.0883 
(0.0829) 
0.0415 
(0.1755) 
0.0961 
(0.1771) 
Trade openness 
-0.0007 
(0.0107) 
-0.0055 
(0.0114) 
-0.0172 
(0.0213) 
-0.0174 
(0.0109) 
0.0090 
(0.0121) 
0.0039 
(0.0122) 
-0.0169 
(0.0165) 
-0.0231*  
(0.0131) 
0.0104 
(0.0102) 
0.0111 
(0.0158) 
0.0007 
(0.0147) 
-0.0018 
(0.0151) 
-0.0004 
(0.0105) 
-0.0230** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0239 
(0.0351) 
-0.0490 
(0.0302) 
No. Obs. 904 872 631 622 448 433 393 384 193 189 134 134 263 250 104 104 
No. Countries 124 119 109 106 82 78 79 76 38 37 31 31 29 28 16 16 
Breusch-Pagan/ 
Cook-Weisberg 
test  
54.36 
(0.000) 
37.33 
(0.000) 
9.810 
 (0.0017) 
2.95  
(0.0861) 
0.650 
(0.420) 
0.85  
(0.2583) 
0.14  
(0.7109) 
1.39 
(0.2391) 
1.04 
(0.3087) 
10.35 
(0.0013) 
0.87 
(0.3504) 
4.32 
(0.0376) 
68.53 
(0.0000) 
47.88 
(0.0000) 
18.68 
(0.0000) 
18.69 
(0.0000) 
Mean VIF  
[Max VIF] 
1.51  
[2.31] 
1.59  
[2.51] 
1.24  
[1.59] 
1.31  
[1.69] 
1.25  
[1.46] 
1.22  
[1.45] 
1.25  
[1.44] 
1.21  
[1.42] 
1.22 
[1.42] 
1.23 
[1.39] 
1.18 
[1.30] 
1.24 
[1.35] 
1.16 
[1.24] 
1.18 
[1.31] 
1.13 
[1.24] 
1.21 
[1.52] 
Hausman test  
(p-value) 
5.31 
(0.5051) 
5.86 
(0.4394) 
14.76 
(0.022) 
17.96 
(0.0063) 
45.40 
(0.0000) 
13.72 
(0.0329) 
33.25  
(0.000) 
5.15 
(0.5248) 
19.82 
(0.0030) 
46.36 
(0.0000) 
26.07 
(0.0002) 
148.85 
(0.0000) 
231.93 
(0.0000) 
Chi2<0 
11.50 
(0.0742) 
8.38 
(0.2118) 
RE vs FE RE RE FE FE FE FE FE RE FE FE FE FE FE RE FE RE 
Robust errors YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Legend: FL1: FDI/GDP; FL2: Chinn and Ito Index, 2008; FD1: Private credit/GDP; FD2: Monetization ratio. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**) [*] statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%].
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5. Conclusion  
5.1. Main contributions 
In recent years, income inequality has been a major topic of  attention generally associated 
with losses in economic and social fields (World Inequality Lab, 2018). Extant literature has 
proposed several possible causes for this phenomenon, such as the quality of  institutions, 
corruption, labour markets, technological change, financial liberalization or financial devel-
opment (Bumann and Lensink, 2016).  
Studies that addressed the impact of  financial liberalization and development on countries’ 
income inequality did not convey clear-cut results (both at theoretical and empirical levels), 
maintaining an open debate (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2007; Bumann and Lensink, 2016; de Haan and Sturm, 2017; de Haan, Pleninger 
and Sturm, 2017). Furthermore, some contend that the quality of  the institutions, and spe-
cifically the countries’ corruption context, are likely to influence the relation between these 
variables (e.g., Delis, Hasan and Kazakis, 2014; Batabyal and Chowdhury, 2015; Adams and 
Klobodu, 2016). However, to the best of  our knowledge no attempt has yet been made to 
investigate the mediating effect of  corruption on the relation between financial liberaliza-
tion and income inequality.  
Therefore, the contributions of  the present study to the scientific literature are twofold. 
First, at the theoretical level, this study presents a novel, more encompassing framework, 
explicating the potential mechanisms/ channels - access to financial markets and services, 
economic growth, financial crisis and credit restrictions reduction - by which financial lib-
eralization and financial development may impact on countries’ income inequality, and in-
troducing the potential mediating effect of  corruption on the relation between financial 
liberalization/ development and income inequality.  
Second, at the empirical level, we resorted to panel data model estimations, involving a 
large sample of  127 countries over a relatively long period, 2000-2017, which updates pre-
vious empirical analysis whose estimations encompasses periods ranging between 1961 and 
2011 (Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Agnello, Mallick and Sousa, 2014; Delis, Hasan and 
Kazakis, 2014; Bumman and Lensink, 2016; Naceur and Zhang, 2016; de Haan and Sturm, 
2017), and includes the world financial crisis, a period still overlooked by the relevant litera-
ture in this area. Moreover, in a similar reasoning to that of  Batabyal and Chowdhury 
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(2015) who analysed the impact of  the interaction between corruption and financial devel-
opment on income inequality of 30 Commonwealth countries by income level, between 
1995 and 2008, we introduce the mediating effect of corruption on the impact of  financial 
liberalization and financial development on income inequality. 
We came up with three main results. First, when measured by the net inflows of  foreign 
direct investment (the FDI/GDP ratio), financial liberalization tends to reduce income 
inequality, whereas when proxied by a measure of  the degree of  capital account openness 
(the Chinn and Ito (2008) index), it seems to accentuate the asymmetries of  income in con-
texts of  high corruption. Second, our results imply that financial development is likely to 
decrease income inequality, regardless the indicator used (private credit/GDP or the mone-
tization ratio). Finally, we concluded that corruption is a mediator factor in the relation 
between financial liberalization/development and income inequality. In other words, the 
impact of  these variables on income inequality critically depends on the countries’ level of  
corruption. In particular, our results suggest that the impact is accentuated the more in-
tense the context of  corruption, i.e., the higher the countries’ level of  corruption, the 
stronger the impact of  financial liberalization/ development on increasing/ decreasing 
income divergences. In what it concerns to high transparency/ low corruption countries, 
there is no statistical evidence regarding the impact of  financial liberalization/ development 
on income divergences.  
Our study extends the extant literature by analysing the joint effect of  both financial liber-
alization and financial development on income inequality, a task developed only by a few of  
studies (see Ang, 2010; Naceur and Zhang, 2016; de Haan and Sturm, 2017). Researches by 
Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012), Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015), Jauch and Watzka (2015), 
Adams and Klobodu (2016) and Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, and Mahalik (2017) have analysed 
the impact of  financial development on income inequality but have not included financial 
liberalization, whereas Li and Yu (2014), Agnello, Mallick and Sousa (2014), Delis, Hasan 
and Kazakis (2014), Batuo and Asongu (2015), Bumman and Lensink (2016) and de Haan, 
Pleninger and Sturm (2017) have analysed the impact of  financial liberalization on income 
inequality but have not included financial development. Furthermore, as referred earlier it 
accounts for the countries’ corruption context mediating role on the relation between fi-
nancial liberalization/ development and income inequality. The only studies in this area 
which have introduced the issue of  corruption as mediating factor between financial devel-
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opment and income inequality were Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015) and Adams and 
Klobodu (2016). These studies, however, focused on only financial development and tar-
geted a limited set of  countries, the 30 Commonwealth countries (Batabyal and Chow-
dhury, 2015) and 21 sub-Saharan African countries (Adams and Klobodu, 2016).  
 
5.2. Policy implications 
Our results suggest interesting policy implications. There is evidence that in the case of  
high and middle corruption contexts financial development tends to reduce income ine-
quality to a larger extent than it does in low corruption contexts. This is at odds with the 
findings of  Batabyal and Chowdhury (2015) and Adams and Klobodu (2016) who con-
cluded that in contexts of  high corruption, financial development tends to exacerbate in-
come asymmetries. Furthermore, we also found evidence that, for the same group of  coun-
tries, increasing the levels of  FDI (as percentage of  the GDP), that is, having high levels of  
financial liberalization, has an income inequality decreasing effect.  
Thus, public authorities in middle and highly corrupted countries can curb income ine-
qualities by investing and/or making serious efforts to develop financial markets, namely by 
increasing the private credit levels or attracting foreign direct investment.  
 
5.3. Limitations and paths for future research 
The present analysis by assessing the mediating role of  corruption on the relation between 
financial liberalization and financial development on income inequality presents several 
limitations, which may promote new avenues for future research. For instance, this study 
could not encompass alternative endeavours such as specific countries analyses, investiga-
tions on how distinct the impact of  financial liberalization/development on income ine-
quality would be before and after the financial crisis or exploring the effect on different 
types of  inequalities (such as wealth, wage or living conditions inequality).  
Therefore, interesting avenues of  exploration for new investigations may approach the 
mediating role of  corruption on the impact of  financial liberalization/ development on a 
particular country’s income inequality (following Ang, 2010 and Shahbaz, Bhattacharya, 
and Mahalik, 2017, which examined India and Kazakhstan, respectively), as well as to ex-
plore how these variables might impact differently taking into account the social, economic 
and financial changes due to the financial crisis period and how distinguished the effects 
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may be according to the type of  inequality analysed.  
43 
 
References 
Abiad, A., Detragiache, E., and Tressel, T. (2009). A new database of  financial reforms. 
IMF Staff  Papers, 57(2), 281-302.  
Abiad, A., Oomes, N., and Ueda, K. (2008). The quality effect: Does financial liberalization 
improve the allocation of  capital? Journal of  Development Economics, 87(2), 270-282.  
Adams, S., and Klobodu, E.K.M. (2016). Financial development, control of  corruption and 
income inequality. International Review of  Applied Economics, 30(6), 790-808.  
Agnello, L., Mallick, S.K., and Sousa, R.M. (2012). Financial reforms and income inequality. 
Economics Letters, 116(3), 583-587.  
Ang, J.B. (2010). Finance and inequality: The case of  India. Southern Economic Journal, 76(3), 
738–761.  
Arestis, P., and Caner, A. (2004). Financial liberalization and poverty: Channels of  influence 
(Working Paper No. 411). Levy Economics Institute of  Bard College, Annandale-
on-Hudson, NY. 
Babbie, E. R. (2011). The basics of  social research. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth. 
Banerjee, A.V., and Newman, A.F. (1993). Occupational choice and the process of  devel-
opment. Journal of  Political Economy, 101, 274-298. 
Batabyal, S., and Chowdhury, A. (2015). Curbing corruption, financial development and 
income inequality. Progress in Development Studies, 15(1), 49-72.  
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Levine, R. (2007). Finance, inequality and the poor. Jour-
nal of  Economic Growth 12, 27-49. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2011). Combating corruption: On the interplay between institutional quality 
and social trust. The Journal of  Law & Economics, 54(1), 135-159 
Bumann, S., and Lensink, R. (2016). Capital account liberalization and income inequality. 
Journal of  International Money and Finance, 61, 143-162.  
Chinn, M. D., and Ito, H. (2008). A new measure of  financial openness. Journal of  Compara-
tive Policy Analysis, 10 (3), 309-322. 
Chong, A., and Gradstein, M. (2007). Inequality and institutions. Review of  Economics and 
Statistics, 89, 454-465. 
44 
 
Christopoulos, D., and McAdam, P. (2017). Do financial reforms help stabilize inequality? 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 70, 45-61.  
Čihák, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Feyen, E., and Levine, R. (2012), Benchmarking financial 
systems around the World (Policy Research Working Paper No. 6175). Retrieved 
from World Bank Group website: http://documents.worldbank.org on the 25th Oc-
tober 2018. 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Darity, W. (1982). The human capital approach to black-white earning inequality: Some 
unsettled questions. Journal of  Human Resources. 17(1), 72-93. 
de Haan, J., and Sturm, J.-E. (2017). Finance and income inequality: A review and new evi-
dence. European Journal of  Political Economy, 50, 171-195.  
de Haan, J., Pleninger, R., and Sturm, J.-E. (2017). Does the impact of  financial liberaliza-
tion on income inequality depend on financial development? Some new evidence. 
Applied Economics Letters, 25(5), 313-316.  
Deaton, A. (2013). The great scape: Health, wealth and the origins of  inequality. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press. 
Delis, M. D., Hasan, I., and Kazakis, P. (2014). Bank regulations and income inequality: 
Empirical Evidence. Review of Finance, 18(5), 1811-1846.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Levine, R. (2009). Finance and inequality: Theory and evidence 
(Working Paper No. 15275). NBER. 
European Commission (2014). Gender Pay Gap in EU Countries based on SES, retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-
equality/equal-pay/gender-pay-gap-situation-eu_en on the 24th November.  
Galor, O., and Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 60, 35-52. 
Greenwood, J., and Jovanovic, B. (1990). Financial development, growth, and the distribu-
tion of income. Journal of  Political Economy, 98, 1076–1107. 
Hamori, S., and Hashiguchi, Y. (2012). The effect of financial deepening on inequality: 
Some international evidence. Journal of Asian Economics, 23(4), 353-359.  
45 
 
Haughton, J., and Khandker, S. R. (2009). Handbook on Poverty and Inequality. Washington, 
DC: The World Bank. 
Hurst, C.E. (2007). Social Inequality: Forms, Causes and Consequences. Boston, MA: Pearson. 
Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of  Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71-122. 
Jauch, S., and Watzka, S. (2015). Financial development and income inequality: a panel data 
approach. Empirical Economics, 51(1), 291-314. 
Jaumotte, F., Lall, S., and Papageorgiou, C. (2013). Rising income inequality: Technology, 
or trade and financial globalization? IMF Economic Review, 61(2), 271-309. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. (2005). Governance matters IV: Governance indi-
cators for 1996–2004 (Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630). World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.  
Knox, C. (2009). Dealing with sectoral corruption in Bangladesh: Developing citizen in-
volvement. Public Administration and Development, 29(2), 117-132.  
Kunieda, T., Okada, K., and Shibata, A. (2013). Finance and inequality: How does globali-
zation change their relationship? Macroeconomic Dynamics, 18(05), 1091-1128.  
Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Be-
havioural Scientist, 8, 8-14. 
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. In P. Aghion and S. Durlauf  
(eds.), Handbook of  Economic Growth (1st ed., pp.865-934). Amsterdam: North-
Holland Elsevier Publishers 
Li, J., and Yu, H. (2014). Income inequality and financial reform in Asia: The role of human 
capital. Applied Economics, 46(24), 2920-2935.  
Madsen, F. G. (2013). Corruption: A global common evil. Royal United Services Institute Jour-
nal. 158(2), 26-38. 
Mankiw, N. G. (2013). Defending the one percent. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 21-34. 
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 110(3), 167 – 95. 
Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and the composition of  government expenditure. Journal of  
Public Economics. 69(2), 263–279. 
46 
 
McKinnon, R.I. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. The American Political 
Science Review, 68(4), 1822-1824. 
Méon, P.-G., and Weill, L. (2005). Does better governance foster efficiency? An aggregate 
frontier analysis. Economics of  Governance, 6(1), 75–90. 
Naceur, S. B., and Zhang, R. X. (2016). Financial development, inequality and poverty: 
Some international evidence. (IMF Working Paper 16/32). IMF, Washington, DC. 
Ngamaba, K. H., Panagioti, M., and Armitage, C. J. (2018). Income inequality and subjec-
tive well-being: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Quality of Life Research 27(3), 
577-596. 
North, D. C. (1990). An introduction to institutions and institutional change. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97-112.  
O’Brien, R. M. (2007). A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. 
Quality & Quantity, 41, 673–690. 
OECD (2011). Society at a Glance 2011- OECD Social Indicators. Retrieved from 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ on the 7th May 2019.  
OECD (2014). Effective Institutions-Building More Effective, Accountable, and Inclusive Institutions 
for All. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org on the 9th October 2018. 
OECD (2016). Society at a Glance 2016- OECD Social Indicators. Retrieved from 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ on the 20th October 2018. 
OECD (2017). Update report 2017- Inclusive Growth. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org on 
the 22nd October 2018. 
OECD (2018a). A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility, Paris: OECD Pub-
lishing. 
OECD (2018b), Income Inequality (Indicator). Paris: OECD Publishing.  
Park, H. and Blenkinsopp, J. (2011). The roles of  transparency and trust in the relationship 
between corruption and citizen satisfaction. International Review of  Administrative Sci-
ences, 77(2), 254-274. 
Patnaik, I. and Shah, A. (2010). Asia confronts the impossible trinity. (ADBI working paper 
47 
 
series No. 204). Asian Development Bank Institute. 
Peiffer, C. and Rose, R. (2018). Why are the poor more vulnerable to bribery in Africa? The 
institutional effects of  services. Journal of  Development Studies, 54(1), 18-29. 
Peterson, E. W. F. (2017). Is economic inequality really a problem? A review of  the argu-
ments. Social Sciences, 6(4), 147. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975). The economics of  corruption. Journal of  Public Economics, 4(2), 
187-203. 
Senior, I. (2006). Corruption – The World’s Big C – Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures. London: 
The Institute of  Economic Affairs.  
Shahbaz, M., Bhattacharya, M., and Mahalik, M. K. (2017). Finance and income inequality 
in Kazakhstan: evidence since transition with policy suggestions. Applied Economics, 
49(52), 5337-5351.  
Shaw, E. S. (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. American Journal of  Agri-
cultural Economics, 56 (3), 670. 
Syrichas, G. (2008). Monetary policy strategy and the euro: Lessons from Cyprus. Cyprus 
Economic Policy Review, 2 (2), 81-102. 
Todaro, M., and Smith, S. (2015). Poverty, Inequality and development. In D. Alexander 
(Ed.), Economic Development (12th ed., pp. 216-248). New York: Pearson.  
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of  corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of  Public Eco-
nomics 76(3), 399–457. 
UN (2015). Concepts of  Inequality. Development Issues No.1. Retrieved from 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/no-1-concepts-of-
inequality/ on the 22nd November. 
UNDP (2013). Humanity divided: Confronting Inequality in Developing Countries. United Nations 
Development Programme, Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/ 
US Census Bureau (2010). Statistical Abstract of  the United States. Retrieved from 
https://www2.census.gov/. 
Watson, William (2015). The inequality trap: Fighting capitalism instead of  poverty. Toronto: Uni-
versity of  Toronto Press. 
48 
 
Williams, A. (2011). Shining a light on the resource curse: An empirical analysis of  the rela-
tionship between natural resources, transparency and economic growth. World De-
velopment, 39(4), 490-505. 
World Inequality Lab (2018). World Inequality Report 2018. Retrieved from 
https://wir2018.wid.world/ on the 22nd October 2018. 
49 
 
Annex 
Table A1: Countries by group of  transparency: number of  observations  
Category Country 
Low trans-
parency 
Middle 
transparency 
High trans-
parency Missing 
values 
CPI<40 40≤CPI<60 CPI≥60 
High transparency country Australia     18   
High transparency country Austria     18   
High transparency country Belgium     18   
High transparency country Canada     18   
High transparency country Chile     18   
High transparency country Denmark     18   
High transparency country Estonia   4 14   
High transparency country Finland     17 1 
High transparency country France     18   
High transparency country Germany     18   
High transparency country Iceland     18   
High transparency country Ireland     18   
High transparency country Israel   2 16   
High transparency country Luxembourg     18   
High transparency country Netherlands     18   
High transparency country Norway     18   
High transparency country Portugal   1 17   
High transparency country Spain   4 14   
High transparency country Sweden     18   
High transparency country Switzerland     18   
High transparency country United Kingdom     18   
High transparency country United States     18   
High transparency country Uruguay   4 13 1 
Middle transparency country Botswana   7 11   
Middle transparency country Cyprus   6 9 3 
Middle transparency country Slovenia   6 12   
Middle transparency country Bhutan   5 7 6 
Middle transparency country CostaRica   18     
Middle transparency country CzechRepublic 3 15     
Middle transparency country Greece 4 14     
Middle transparency country Hungary   18     
Middle transparency country Italy 2 16     
Middle transparency country Jordan   18     
Middle transparency country Korea,Rep.   18     
Middle transparency country Latvia 4 14     
Middle transparency country Lithuania   17 1   
Middle transparency country Malaysia   18     
Middle transparency country Malta   11 3 4 
Middle transparency country Mauritius   18     
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Category Country 
Low trans-
parency 
Middle 
transparency 
High trans-
parency Missing 
values 
CPI<40 40≤CPI<60 CPI≥60 
Middle transparency country Namibia   18     
Middle transparency country SlovakRepublic 4 14     
Middle transparency country SouthAfrica   18     
Middle transparency country Tunisia 2 16     
Middle transparency country Brazil 12 6     
Middle transparency country Bulgaria 7 11     
Middle transparency country Croatia 7 11     
Middle transparency country Georgia 8 8   2 
Middle transparency country Montenegro 7 7   4 
Middle transparency country Romania 12 6     
Middle transparency country Rwanda 5 8   5 
Middle transparency country Turkey 7 11     
Middle transparency country Ghana 11 7     
Low transparency country Albania 16     2 
Low transparency country Angola 17     1 
Low transparency country Armenia 16     2 
Low transparency country Azerbaijan 18       
Low transparency country Bangladesh 17     1 
Low transparency country Belarus 12 5   1 
Low transparency country Benin 14     4 
Low transparency country Bolivia 18       
Low transparency country BosniaandHerzegovina 13 2   3 
Low transparency country BurkinaFaso 12 2   4 
Low transparency country Burundi 13     5 
Low transparency country Cameroon 18       
Low transparency country Chad 14     4 
Low transparency country Colombia 17 1     
Low transparency country Comoros 11     7 
Low transparency country Congo,Dem.Rep. 14     4 
Low transparency country Congo,Rep. 15     3 
Low transparency country Coted'Ivoire 18       
Low transparency country DominicanRepublic 17     1 
Low transparency country Ecuador 18       
Low transparency country Egypt,ArabRep. 18       
Low transparency country ElSalvador 13 5     
Low transparency country Eswatini 10 1   7 
Low transparency country Ethiopia 17     1 
Low transparency country Gabon 14     4 
Low transparency country Gambia,The 15     3 
Low transparency country Guatemala 17     1 
Low transparency country Guinea 12     6 
Low transparency country Guinea-Bissau 11     7 
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Category Country 
Low trans-
parency 
Middle 
transparency 
High trans-
parency Missing 
values 
CPI<40 40≤CPI<60 CPI≥60 
Low transparency country Honduras 17     1 
Low transparency country Iran,IslamicRep. 15     3 
Low transparency country Iraq 15     3 
Low transparency country Kazakhstan 18       
Low transparency country Kenya 18       
Low transparency country Kosovo 8     10 
Low transparency country KyrgyzRepublic 15     3 
Low transparency country LaoPDR 13     5 
Low transparency country Lesotho 8 5   5 
Low transparency country Liberia 11 1   6 
Low transparency country Macedonia,FYR 10 5   3 
Low transparency country Madagascar 16     2 
Low transparency country Malawi 17 1     
Low transparency country Maldives 7     11 
Low transparency country Mali 15     3 
Low transparency country Mauritania 12     6 
Low transparency country Mexico 18       
Low transparency country Moldova 18       
Low transparency country Mongolia 14     4 
Low transparency country Morocco 15 2   1 
Low transparency country Mozambique 16     2 
Low transparency country Nepal 14     4 
Low transparency country Nicaragua 17     1 
Low transparency country Niger 14     4 
Low transparency country Nigeria 18       
Low transparency country Pakistan 17     1 
Low transparency country Panama 17     1 
Low transparency country Paraguay 16     2 
Low transparency country Peru 15 3     
Low transparency country RussianFederation 18       
Low transparency country Senegal 13 5     
Low transparency country SierraLeone 15     3 
Low transparency country SolomonIslands 6 1   11 
Low transparency country SriLanka 15 1   2 
Low transparency country Tajikistan 14     4 
Low transparency country Tanzania 18       
Low transparency country Thailand 18       
Low transparency country Timor-Leste 12     6 
Low transparency country Togo 12     6 
Low transparency country Tonga 5     13 
Low transparency country Uganda 18       
Low transparency country Ukraine 18       
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Category Country 
Low trans-
parency 
Middle 
transparency 
High trans-
parency Missing 
values 
CPI<40 40≤CPI<60 CPI≥60 
Low transparency country Venezuela,RB 18       
Low transparency country Vietnam 18       
Low transparency country Yemen,Rep. 15     3 
Low transparency country Zambia 18       
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Table A2: Panel data estimations of  the determinants of  countries’ income inequality with missing values filled, 2000-2017 
 
All countries 
Low transparency /High corruption 
countries (CPI<40) 
Middle transparency /Middle corruption 
countries (40≤CPI<60) 
High transparency /Low corruption 
countries (CPI≥60) 
 Model 
A1 
FL1, FD1 
Model 
A2 
FL2, FD1 
Model 
A3 
FL1, FD2 
Model 
A4 
FL2, FD2 
Model 
B1 
FL1, FD1 
Model 
B2 
FL2, FD1 
Model 
B3 
FL1, FD2 
Model  
B4 
FL2, FD2 
Model 
C1 
FL1, FD1 
Model  
C2 
FL2, FD1 
Model  
C3 
FL1, FD2 
Model  
C4 
FL2, FD2 
Model 
D1 
FL1, FD1 
Model  
D2 
FL2, FD1 
Model 
D3 
FL1, FD2 
Model 
D4 
FL2, FD2 
Financial Liberali-
zation (FL) 
-0.0006 
(0.0023) 
0.2450 
(0.2073) 
-0.0015 
 (0.0063) 
0.1707 
(0.1334) 
0.0010 
(0.0105) 
0.3512* 
(0.1983) 
0.0021 
(0.0102) 
0.3793** 
(0.1843) 
-0.0006 
(0.0036) 
-0.1337 
(0.1638) 
-0.0326** 
(0.0154) 
-0.0151 
(0.1593) 
0.0022 
(0.0021) 
0.0485 
(0.2458) 
0.0052 
(0.0038) 
-0.0895 
(0.4087) 
Financial Devel-
opment (FD) 
-0.0001 
 (0.0003) 
-0.0002  
(0.0004) 
-0.0465*** 
 (0.0160) 
-0.0437*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0004 
(0.0007) 
-0.0001 
(0.0007) 
-0.0697*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0644*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0020 
(0.0021) 
0.0025 
(0.0026) 
-0.0362*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.0332*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0060 
(0.0061) 
0.0052 
(0.0061) 
-0.0157 
(0.0107) 
-0.0167 
(0.0123) 
Transparency 
index 
-0.1065*** 
 (0.0277) 
-0.1123*** 
 (0.0287) 
-0.1027***  
(0.0360) 
-0.1057*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.1965*** 
(0.0238) 
-0.2057*** 
(0.0247) 
-0.1328*** 
(0.0252) 
-0.1345*** 
(0.0255) 
-0.0286 
(0.0207) 
-0.0278 
(0.0417) 
-0.0121 
(0.0220) 
-0.0145 
(0.0222) 
-0.0433 
(0.0429) 
-0.0616 
(0.0404) 
-0.0906 
(0.0677) 
-0.0920 
(0.0690) 
GDP pc growth 
0.0261 
(0.0160) 
0.0315 
(0.0195) 
0.0231 
(0.0160) 
0.0270 
(0.0168) 
0.0282 
(0.0180) 
0.0368* 
(0.0212) 
0.0193 
(0.0178) 
0.0256 
(0.0210) 
0.0276 
(0.02433) 
0.0264 
(0.0318) 
0.0241 
(0.0260) 
0.0181 
(0.0261) 
0.0211 
(0.0372) 
0.0566** 
(0.0284) 
0.0493 
(0.0483) 
0.0535 
(0.0507) 
Inflation 
0.0127 
(0.0098) 
0.0117 
(0.0097) 
0.0111 
(0.0084) 
0.0104*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0114*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0101** 
(0.0039) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0093** 
(0.0039) 
0.0191* 
(0.0101) 
0.0186** 
(0.0090) 
0.0181* 
(0.0102) 
0.0175* 
(0.0103) 
-0.0362 
(0.0628) 
-0.0381 
(0.0587) 
-0.0308 
(0.0842) 
-0.0285 
(0.0805) 
Trade openness 
-0.0078  
(0.0094) 
-0.0171**  
(0.0101) 
-0.0007  
(0.0101) 
-0.0068 
(0.0040) 
-0.0077 
(0.0054) 
-0.0176*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0001 
(0.0054) 
-0.0083 
(0.0057) 
0.0111** 
(0.0056) 
0.0123 
(0.0190) 
0.0150** 
(0.0060) 
0.0139** 
(0.0061) 
0.0009 
(0.0129) 
-0.0259** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0171 
(0.0260) 
-0.0230 
(0.0273) 
No. Obs. 2283 2213 1995 1961 1395 1348 1360 1324 436 429 376 376 452 436 259 261 
No. Countries 127 123 111 109 91 88 86 84 55 54 47 47 30 29 18 18 
Breusch-Pagan/ 
Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroske-
dasticity 
28.22 
(0.0000) 
10.18 
(0.0014) 
1.10 
(0.2935) 
0.69 
(0.4060) 
0.34 
(0.5585) 
0.15 
(0.6993) 
0.54 
(0.4610) 
0.09 
(0.7673) 
4.23 
(0.0398) 
47.41 
(0.0000) 
0.15 
(0.6947) 
30.97 
(0.0000) 
74.34 
(0.0000) 
58.50 
(0.0000) 
23.86 
(0.0000) 
26.71 
(0.0000) 
Mean VIF [Max 
VIF] 
1.11 
[1.20] 
1.21 
[1.56] 
1.21 
[1.56] 
1.30 
[1.79] 
1.05 
[1.09] 
1.04 
[1.07] 
1.12 
[1.22] 
1.10 
[1.22] 
1.10 
[1.25] 
1.12 
[1.22] 
1.09 
[1.17] 
1.15 
[1.23] 
1.18 
[1.34] 
1.17 
[1.34] 
1.09 
[1.15] 
1.12 
[1.19] 
Hausman test 
(p-value) chi2<0 chi2<0 
0.35 
(0.9992) 
chi2<0 
5.52 
(0.4796) 
2.45 
(0.8737) 
5.34 
(0.5014) 
0.21 
(0.9998) 
10.79 
(0.0951) 
11.36 
(0.0779) 
31.93 
(0.0000) 
84.49 
(0.0000) 
23.93 
(0.0005) 
230.15 
(0.0000) 
19.14 
(0.0039) 
23.41 
(0.0007) 
RE vs FE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Robust errors YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Legend: FL1: FDI/GDP; FL2: Chinn and Ito Index, 2008; FD1: Private credit/GDP; FD2: Monetization ratio. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**) [*] statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
